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The Crime of Genocide 
Committed Against the Poles  
by the USSR Before and During 
World War II: An International  
Legal Study 
Karol Karski* 
The USSR’s genocidal activity against the Polish nation 
started before World War II. For instance, during the NKVD’s 
“Polish operation” of 1937 and 1938, the Communist regime 
exterminated about 85,000 Poles living at that time on the pre-
war territory of the USSR. In Soviet newspapers and literature 
the image had been created of the Pole as an enemy. The USSR 
citizens were afraid to acknowledge Polish nationality because 
that meant death. After the aggression of the Third Reich and 
the USSR against Poland in 1939, this policy was extended into 
territory annexed by the USSR and its Polish inhabitants. On 
the basis of the Political Bureau of the All-Union Communist 
Party (Bolsheviks) decision of March 5, 1940 about 22,000 Poles 
were exterminated. Despite the different places of the slayings, 
activities included in its execution are described as the Katyn 
Massacre. Further, four waves of deportations from 1940 to 
1941 were conducted as a way of disintegrating ethnic ties. This 
genocide lasted until the moment when the USSR—not of its 
own will—became a member of the anti-Hitler coalition in 1941.  
Genocide was legally separated as a new type of 
international crime by virtue of the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
Post-war genocide cases, including the Adolf Eichmann trial, 
are not affected by nullum crimen sine lege principle, since acts, 
especially murders, being elements of the crime of genocide were 
already forbidden by international law at the time of its 
commission. Their new classification based on the intent, which 
is the destruction of the group, does not violate that principle. 
* Karol Karski, LL.M., M.A., Ph.D., Habilitated Doctor in Law 
(University of Warsaw). He is the Chair of Public International Law at 
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and the interplay between international law and domestic law. E-mail: 
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On the basis of the 1948 Genocide Convention, German 
perpetrators of pre-war and the World War II genocide were 
brought to justice. On the Soviet and then Russian side no one 
has been punished for the Katyn Massacre. 
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I. Introduction 
“People belonging to national minorities ‘should be forced to their 
knees and shot like mad dogs.’ It was not an SS officer speaking, but 
a communist party leader, in the spirit of the national operations of 
Stalin’s Great Terror.”1 Timothy D. Snyder makes us realize that the 
communist propaganda was highly effective in shaping the narrative 
concerning the Stalinist terror in a way that would discourage us, as 
much as possible, from associating it with the German Nazi terror.2 
He notes that: 
[T]he picture of Stalin’s terror, both in the West and in Poland, 
was shaped by Khrushchev’s 1956 speech in which he talked 
about repressions against the party, against the communists. 
1. Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and 
Stalin 89 (2010). 
2. Id. at 89–90 (giving examples of Communist propaganda).  
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Not against those who really suffered, i.e., the people, peasants 
and also some nationalities.3  
During the Great Terror period in the USSR there were cases of 
whole nationalities being destroyed.4 The motives behind the Soviet 
authorities’ actions varied, although they were largely political. As a 
result, both political and national groups were annihilated.5 Under 
modern principles of international law, if a national group is 
destroyed for any reason, we are dealing with a case of genocide 
crime.6 
According to the Russian historian Natalia Lebedeva, Soviet 
Stalinism and German Nazism were an example of twin regimes.7 As 
Yuri Stetsovsky, a Russian lawyer, points out, even before the USSR’s 
and Third Reich’s attack on Poland (i.e., before the beginning of 
World War II), the USSR authorities launched a smear campaign 
against Poles and began to create a negative Polish stereotype in 
Soviet society.8 Stetsovsky stresses that the “image of Poles as 
enemies could be found not only in newspapers but also in fiction, in 
works by Sholokhov, Babel and Ostrovsky.”9 The anti-Polish attitude 
created by the Soviet authorities gave birth to the image of the 
“Polish lord” as a dangerous and untrustworthy exploiter of other 
nations.10 
3. Timothy Snyder, Człowieczeństwo szpadlem mierzone (interview 
conducted by Krzysztof Masłoń), Rzeczpospolita (May 28, 2011) at 
P8, http://www.rp.pl/artykul/664909-Czlowieczenstwo- szpadlem-mier 
 zone.html (last visited May 6, 2013). Unless otherwise noted, all 
translations of sources originally written in Polish or Russian are 
provided by the author.  
4. Nicolas Werth, The NKVD Mass Secret National Operations (August 
1937 - November 1938), Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence 
(May 17, 2010), http://www.massviolence.org/The-NKVD-Mass-Secret-
National-Operations-August-1937?cs=print (discussing the NKVD’s 
secret operational orders and the Great Terror’s target victims). 
5. Id. 
6. See generally Norman M. Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides (2010) 
(arguing that Stalin’s terroristic reign would constitute genocide). 
7. Natalia S. Lebedeva, Katyń: zbrodnia przeciwko ludzkości 
283(1998). 
8. See generally 1 Yuri I. Stetsovsky, Istoriya Sovetskikh Repressiy 
(1997). 
9. Id. at 454. 
10. Naimark, supra note 6, at 92 (providing information on anti-Polish 
attitudes generated by the Soviet authorities). 
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Joseph Stalin’s anti-Polish sentiment has been a well-known and 
widely described fact.11 George Sandford discusses this issue in 
detail.12 There were many manifestations of this attitude. For 
instance, when the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, Nikolai 
Yezhov, reported that as part of the Soviet secret police’s (NKVD) 
so-called Polish operation between 1937 and 1938, as many as 23,216 
people had already been arrested, the dictator was very pleased: 
“Very good! Keep on digging up and cleaning out this Polish filth. 
Eliminate it in the interest of the Soviet Union.”13 
II. NKVD’s “Polish Operation” of 1937–1938 as an 
Example of Genocide Crime Committed by the USSR 
Against the Poles Before the Outbreak of  
World War II 
Deportations and murders of Poles living in the USSR as well as 
the destruction of “Polishness” in that country had been going on, 
with greater or lesser intensity, from the very moment the Bolsheviks 
came to power.14 By definition, the Poles were regarded as a 
nationality with a particular predilection for spying, sedition and 
wreaking havoc, a view that can be seen in the surviving 
extermination instructions issued by the Soviet authorities. As the 
American historian Terry Martin has calculated, among the various 
national groups subjected to repression, it was the Poles who suffered 
most in the USSR in terms of loss of life.15 
11. See George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: 
Truth, Justice and Memory 82–83 (2005). 
12. Id. at 84. 
13. Snyder, supra note 1, at. 96. See also Nicolas Werth, La Terreur 
et le Désarroi: Staline et Son Système 294 (2007). 
14. See WWII: Behind Closed Doors: The Struggle for Poland, PBS, http:/ 
/www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/struggle-poland.html (last 
visited May 6, 2013). 
15. See generally Terry Martin, The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing, 70 
J. Modern Hist. 813, 813–61 (1998). See also Stephane Courtois, 
Raphael Lemkin and the Question of Genocide Under Communist 
Regimes, in Rafał Lemkin: A Hero of Humankind 117, 138 
(Joanna Sokólska ed., Jean-Jacques Granas trans., 2010); Mikołaj 
Iwanow, Pierwszy naród ukarany: Polacy w Związku 
Radzieckim w latach 1921–1939 (1991); Wojciech Lizak, 
Rozstrzelana Polonia. Polacy w ZSRR 1917–1939 (1990); 
Mieczysława Łozińskiego, Operacja Polska: Stalinowska 
zbrodnia na Polakach w latach 1937–1938 (2008) (providing more 
information on the actions of the Soviet government against Poles before 
WWII). 
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In the period preceding World War II, the extermination of Poles 
in the USSR reached its apogee during the Great Terror.16 The so-
called Polish operation was one of the national operations carried out 
at the time by the NKVD. It was based on an order issued by the 
People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, Nikolai Yezhov, and 
approved by the Political Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party 
(Bolsheviks) (hereinafter the Politburo) on August 9, 1937.17 The 
broad scope of repressions meant that in practice the action covered 
all Poles, regardless of their social group or class.18 What constituted 
a crime and could lead to death was, for instance, having relatives in 
Poland and staying in touch with them, even if only through 
correspondence. The decisive factors were national origin and links to 
Poland and Poles. In order to be shot, one did not even have to be a 
pronounced member of the “Polish Military Organisation;”19 
“potential membership” was enough.20 There is some logic in it, if we 
bear in mind the fact that the Soviet authorities knew that this 
organisation did not exist.21 
According to Snyder: 
Between 1937 and 1938 Poles were blamed in the USSR for the 
failures of collectivisation and the Great Famine, allegedly 
caused by an extensive spy network masquerading as the Polish 
Military Organisation. Of course the name of this WWI 
independence-oriented organisation is well-known, but in areas 
that came under Soviet rule it ceased to operate in…1921. 
However, the NKVD decided to reactivate it for its own 
purposes; as a result, among the 143,000 people arrested on a 
charge of spying for Poland, 111,000, including at least 85,000 
16. 1937–1939: The Great Terror, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www. 
globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/stalin-great-terror.htm       
(last updated Sept. 7, 2011) (describing the specifics of the Great Terror 
and Stalin’s use of the Great Terror to increase his control and power).  
17. See Rolf Binner, Marc Junge & Terry Martin, The Great Terror in the 
Provinces of the USSR, 1937-1938, 42 Cahiers du Monde russe 679, 
680 (2001).  
18. Werth, supra note 4, at 2. 
19. See id. (noting the all-encompassing breadth of Yezhov’s directives 
targeting Polish nationals for liquidation). 
20. Cf. id. 
21. Snyder, supra note 1, at 90–91 (describing the Polish Military 
Organization as a “pure bureaucratic fantasy” invented during the 1933 
Soviet famine). 
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Poles, were executed. As far as I know, none of the victims of 
this terror against a nation was a spy.22 
When it comes to sheer numbers, this was NKVD’s largest 
operation against members of a specific nationality, in this case 
Polish.23 Those who were arrested but not murdered were deported to 
the Central Asian republics and to Siberia.24 The scale of the 
operation was so huge that, for instance, in Berdichev, 60% of Poles 
living there were arrested by June 1938. The graves of people 
murdered at the time are scattered throughout the former USSR.25 
Dariusz Kucharski notes that: 
There are well-known cases of Poles (and Latvians) being 
arrested in Rostov-on-Don on the basis of information received 
from address bureaus (for their Polish-sounding names), often 
without any charges; only after they were executed were actions 
“unworthy of Soviet citizens” attributed to them. People, 
including minors and pregnant women, were shot without 
exception for [Polish] nationalism.26  
During the NKVD’s so-called Polish operation, “data on local 
Poles would be collected on a mass scale. The anti-Polish pressure 
created in society was so huge that in practice the very fact of being 
Polish and admitting it was tantamount to suicide.”27 
Even the “correct ideological attitude” was no protection against 
extermination. It was at that time that members of the Communist 
Party of Poland (KPP) who had found themselves in the USSR were 
murdered. Among the members of the KPP’s Central Committee, 
those that survived were kept in Polish prisons at the time, which 
22. Snyder, supra note 3. See also Krzysztof Kloc, Historyczny przeglad 
prasy (23-29 maja 2011) Histmag.org (May 31, 2011), http://hist 
mag.org/?id=5586. 
23. Snyder, supra note 1, at 103–04. 
24. Werth, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing the Soviet deportation policy of 
targeted national and ethnic groups). 
25. For example, Polish graves exist in Bykivnia and Kurapaty. See 
generally François-Xavier Nérard, The Levashovo Cemetery and the 
Great Terror in the Leningrad Region, Online Encyclopedia of 
Mass Violence 6–7 (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.massviolence.org/the-
levashovo-cemetery-and-the-great-terror-in-the?cs=print (providing 
information on mass burial sites scattered across parts of the former 
Soviet Union). 
26. Dariusz Piotr Kucharski, Ludobójstwo na Polakach w 
Sowietach w okresie międzywojennym (1921–1939): początek 
wielkiej narodowej tragedii 35 (2010). 
27. Id. at 41. 
708 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2013 
The Crime of Genocide Committed Against the Poles 
meant that they could not be political refugees in the USSR. As 
Tomasz Sommer emphasizes: 
A genocide of Poles took place in the Soviet Union in the late 
1930s. The victims were selected on the basis of national and 
political criteria, with their ethnicity being cited in both cases 
as a function that determined their alleged “guilt.” The decision 
to carry out the genocide was made by the highest ranking 
Soviet officials.28 
III. The Katyn Massacre as an Example of Genocide 
Crime Committed by the USSR Against the Poles 
After the Outbreak of World War II 
As Germany and the USSR started World War II in September 
1939, millions of Poles found themselves under these two invaders’ 
power.29 The USSR expanded its criminal policy against the Poles to 
its expanding territories.30 Nationalistic anti-Polish slogans were 
bandied about during the USSR’s attack on Poland.31 The Ukrainian 
historians Nikolai Kucherepa and Valentin Visyn point out that the 
Soviet army entering Poland on September 17, 1939, “called on the 
locals to murder the ‘Polish lords.’”32 The locals were supposed to be 
Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians persecuted by the allegedly few 
Poles living there. The “Polish lords” included all the Poles living in 
the area annexed by the USSR at the time. Shaped by Soviet 
propaganda, this was a synonym of every Pole, a person deserving 
28. See Rozstrzelać Polaków: ludobójstwo Polaków w Związku 
Sowieckim w latach 1937–1938 ; dokumenty z centrali, pt. IV 
(Tomasz Sommer ed., 2010); Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The 
Court of the Red Tsar 228 (2004) (referring to the Polish massacre 
as a “mini-genocide”).  
29. Invasion of Poland, Fall 1939, United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=100 
05070 (last updated May 11, 2012) (discussing the 1939 partitioning of 
Poland). 
30. Zbigniew Gluza, The Katyn Massacre, Repub. of Pol., http: 
//en.poland.gov.pl/The,Katyn,Massacre,,7296.html (last visited May 6, 
2013) (defining Katyn as the “symbol of the criminal policy of the 
Soviet system against the Polish nation”). 
31. See, e.g., Martin A. Doherty, Nazi Wireless Propaganda: Lord 
Haw-Haw and British Public Opinion in the Second World 
War 41–42 (2000) (discussing German and Soviet cooperation in the 
production of anti-Polish propaganda). 
32. Nikolai Kucherepa & Valentin Visyn, Radjynska Vlada na Volyni 1939–
1941 Rokakh, in Zbrodnie NKWD na obszarze województw 
wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 69 (Boguslaw Polak ed., 
1995). 
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nothing but hate and contempt, allegedly exploiting the Belarusians, 
and Ukrainians living in these lands—that is, the people whom the 
Red Army came to “protect.”33 
Six months after the Third Reich’s and the USSR’s aggression on 
Poland, on March 5, 1940,34 the Politburo approved the conclusions 
concerning the intellectual elite of the Polish nation imprisoned by the 
USSR. These conclusions were included in a note written by the 
People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR, Lavrenty P. 
Beria, to Stalin.35 A decision was made at the time to murder “the 
14,700 former Polish officers, officials, landowners, police, intelligence 
agents, gendarmes, [military] settlers, and prison officers” as well as 
“the 11,000 members of various [counter-revolutionary] espionage and 
sabotage organisations, former landowners, manufacturers, former 
Polish officers, officials and refugees. . . .”36 The decision made at the 
time meant the extermination of about 25,700 Polish nationals held in 
camps located in Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov as well as in 
various prisons, including those in Minsk, Kharkhov, Kiev, and 
Kherson. In the end, a total of 21,768 people, both civilians and 
33. Cf. Telegram No. 371 from Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, 
Ambassador, Ger., to Joachim von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of 
Ger., (Sep. 16, 1939) [hereinafter Telegram No. 371], available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns073.asp (arguing that the 
Soviet Union must enter Poland to protect its “Ukrainian and 
Belarusian brothers”). 
34. For more on the Third Reich’s and the USSR’s aggression on Poland in 
1939 and on the annexation of Poland’s territory by these states, see 
Czesław Grzelak, Agresja Związku Sowieckiego na Polskę we wrześniu 
1939 r., in Zbrodnia katyńska: droga do prawdy : historia, 
archeologia, kryminalistyka, polityka, prawo 17 (Marek 
Tarczyński ed., 1992) (providing more information on the German and 
Soviet invasions of Poland in 1939 and their subsequent annexations of 
Polish territory); Miroslaw Granat, Aspekty prawne agresji 17 września 
1939 r., in O likwidację skutków zmowy Hitler-Stalin : 
materiały z konferencji zorganizowanej przez Komisję 
Ustawodawczą oraz Komisję Spraw Zagranicznych i Integracji 
Europejskiej 58–59 (Małgorzata Lipińska ed., 1999); Jerzy Łojek, 
Agresja 17 września 1939: Studium aspektów politycznych 65–
71 (1990); Tadeusz Jasudowicz, Widmo krąży po Europie: 
bezprawie paktu Ribbentrop-Mołotow 52–80, 170–74 (1993); 
Karol Karski, Agresja ZSRR na Polskę w 1939 roku: Aspekty 
prawnomiędzynarodowe, I Międzynarodowe Prawo Humanitarne 
205, 205–25 (2010). 
35. Beria Memorandum to Joseph Stalin Proposing the Execution of the 
Polish Officers (Mar. 5, 1940), in Katyn: A Crime Without 
Punishment 118–20 (Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva & 
Wojciech Materski eds., Marian Schwartz, Anna M. Cienciala & Maia 
A. Kipp trans., 2007) [hereinafter March 5th Execution Order]. 
36. Id. at 119–20. 
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military men, were killed on the basis of this decision.37 The latter 
group included landowners, government officials, settlers, refugees, 
and even pupils.38 The victims of the Katyn Massacre were not, as it 
is commonly believed, only soldiers taken prisoner during military 
operations, but also civilians and soldiers arrested after the military 
operations had already ended.39 The murder itself—institutionalised 
and carried out on behalf of the Soviet state—took place between 
April 3 and May 19, 1940.40 Regardless of the number of sites where 
Poles were slaughtered, for the international community this will 
always be the Katyn Massacre, because Katyn, where the first mass 
graves of the victims were discovered, has become its symbol. 
This massacre is often classified as genocide.41 However, there are 
opinions to the contrary. People who voice their views on the issue 
are not only lawyers, but also politicians, sociologists, political 
scientists, and historians. We should, therefore, establish whether this 
crime—for there is no doubt that it was a crime—can be treated as 
the crime of genocide under international law.42 
37. Press Release, The Institute of National Remembrance, Decision to 
Commence Investigation into Katyn Massacre (Jan. 12, 2004), available 
at http://www.ipn.gov.pl/portal/en/2/77/Decision_to_commence_inve 
stigation_into_Katyn_Massacre.html [hereinafter Decision to 
Commence Investigation]. See also Wojciech Materski, Jeńcy wojenni i 
internowani w latach 1939–1941, in Polska 1939–1945. Straty 
osobowe i ofiary represji pod dwiema okupacjami 215, 221 
(Wojciech Materski &Tomasz Szarota eds., 2009). 
38. Jędrzej Tucholski, Katyń – liczby i motywy, in 5 Zeszyty katyńskie – 
II półwiecze zbrodni: Katyń, Twer, Charków 46, 46–63 (Marek 
Tarczyński ed., 1995). 
39. See, e.g., Janina Snitko-Rzeszut, Jan Kiński, Pro Memoria, 3–4 
Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny 355, 355–91, 347–73 (1995); Pro 
Memoria, 1 Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny 262, 262–93, 251–80 
(1996); Pro Memoria, 4 Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny 383, 383–
408 (1996); Pro Memoria, 1–2 Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny 
360, 360–86 (1997) (providing a list of people that were murdered at 
Katyn). See also Teresa Kaczorowska, Children of the Katyn 
Massacre: Accounts of Life After the 1940 Soviet Murder of 
Polish POWs 1, 3, 4, 17, 58, 80, 92, 249 (2006) (providing an 
interesting look into the people listed above through the memories of 
their children, who, are convinced that the Katyn Massacre was an act 
of genocide).  
40. Tucholski, supra note 38, at 136. 
41. See Anna Cienciala, Poland, Russia, and Katyn – Is Reconciliation 
Possible?, Cosmopolitan Rev., Dec. 6, 2010, http://cosmopolitanrev 
iew.com/poland-russia-and-katyn/ (describing public demand in Poland 
to classify Katyn as a genocide).  
42. On the changing positions of the USSR and the Russian Federation in 
this respect, especially in the political context, see id. Robert H. 
Donaldson & Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: 
Changing Systems, Enduring Interests 380 n.32 (4th ed. 2009). 
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Genocide could have been committed during World War II both 
by the Germans and by the USSR and its officials. Symptomatically, 
the Soviet prosecutor, Colonel Yury Pokrovsky, accused the Germans 
before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal) of 
committing genocide in Katyn. Referring to the statements of the 
indictment concerning genocide conducted by the Germans on 
February 14, 1946, he presented the Katyn Massacre as a planned 
“physical extermination of the Slav peoples.”43 This was part of the 
indictment into which the USSR added the information that the 
massacre was a German crime. In the end, the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
having examined the witnesses, did not attribute this crime to the 
Germans. In its judgment, it did not refer to this matter at all. As 
scholars have pointed out, attributing this crime to its real 
perpetrator—Germany’s totalitarian Soviet ally at the time when the 
crime was committed—could have led to the collapse of the trial and 
the Soviet judge’s refusal to sign the entire judgment.44 
The USSR did not hesitate in trying to obtain a confirmation of 
the “Katyn denial” from the Nuremberg Tribunal. In this way, the 
Soviet crime would have been attributed to the German Nazis thanks 
to the authority of this judicial body. At the same time the Soviet 
Union tried—and, incidentally, failed—to ban evidence to the 
contrary, including evidence from the examination of witnesses. It 
hoped that one official document submitted by the Soviet government 
would be sufficient. The USSR was a state, which treated the 
international justice system as an instrument of its own policy. When 
commenting on the Soviet attempt to put the blame for its crime on 
the Germans, the Russian historian Nikita Petrov said: 
Moscow had to lose the [Nuremberg] battle for Katyn, because 
those in the Kremlin did not understand (just like they do not 
understand it today) what an independent court was. There was 
and there still is a belief that the role of judges is to confirm the 
government’s decisions by issuing their rulings, and witnesses 
are just a decoration. The script is written outside the 
courtroom.45 
43. See Adam Bosiacki, The Unfinished Business of Katyn, Hoover 
Digest (2012), available at 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-dige st/article/105461; 
Tadeusz Jasudowicz, Zbrodnia Katyńska przed Trybunałem 
Norymberskim, Sybirak, 1990, at 12–15. 
44. Witold Kulesza, Zbrodnia Katyńska jako akt ludobójstwa, in Zbrodnia 
Katyńska: W kRęgu Prawdy i Kłamstwa 52-67 (Sławomir 
Kalbarczyk ed., 2010). 
45. Wacław Radziwinowicz, Żelazna Maska: tajny więzień Stalina, Gazeta 
Wyborcza, Feb. 27, 2012, at 6. 
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IV. The Concept of the Crime of Genocide 
The concept of genocide emerged during World War II.46 The 
term’s creator, Raphael Lemkin, said at the time that this new word 
denoted “an old practice in its modern development.” He defined it as 
“a crime of destruction of national, racial and religious groups.”47 He 
also added that genocide: 
[D]oes not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a 
nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all 
members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a 
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction 
of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the 
aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of 
such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social 
institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, the 
economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of 
the personal security, liberty, health, dignity and even the lives 
of the individuals belonging to such groups.48  
This was repeated—many years later—by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which stated that: 
Contrary to popular belief, the crime of genocide does not imply 
the actual extermination of a group in its entirety, but is 
understood as such once any one of the acts mentioned in 
Article 2(2)(a) through 2(2)(e) [of the Tribunal’s Statute] is 
committed with the specific intent to destroy ‘in whole or in 
part’ a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.49 
These acts are:  
         a) Killing members of the group;  
46. See Raphael Lemkin, Genocide, 15 Am. Scholar 227, 227–28 (1946) 
(discussing the etymology of the term genocide).  
47. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe 79 (2d ed. 2005). 
For more on Lemkin’s concept, see generally Adam Daniel Rotfeld, The 
Lemkin Concept of Genocide: A New Definition for an Old Crime, in 
Rafał Lemkin: A Hero of Humankind, supra note 15, at 19, 19–27 
(discussing Lemkin’s development of the term genocide in light of post-
World War II global developments and United Nations responses); Jean-
Louis Panné, Raphael Lemkin and Raul Hilberg: About a Concept, in 
Rafał Lemkin: A Hero of Humankind, supra note 20, at 101–16 
(describing the influences of legal frameworks on the development of the 
term genocide). 
48. Lemkin, supra note 47, at 79.  
49. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 497 (Sept. 
2, 1998). 
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         b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group;  
         c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part;  
         d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; and 
         e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.50  
The solution adopted in Article 2(2)(a) through 2(2)(e) of the 
Statute of the Tribunal repeats the definition included in Article 2 of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 
December 9, 1948.51 
As Lemkin noted, “Genocide is directed against the national 
group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against 
individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the 
national group.”52 In this light a special meaning can be attributed to 
a statement included in a decision of the Politburo on March 5, 1940. 
This decision said that, all people—both civilians and military men—
should, “using the special procedure, apply to them the supreme 
punishment, [execution by] shooting. Examine these cases without 
calling in the arrested men and without presenting [them with] 
charges, the decision about the end of the investigation or the 
document of indictment. . . .”53 They were treated not as individuals 
but as members of a collective, as members of a group. 
The UN General Assembly, in a unanimously adopted resolution, 
number 96(I) of December 11, 1946, affirmed that “genocide is a 
crime under international law . . .” and moreover, “is contrary to 
50. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 
2(2)(a)–(e), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598. 
51. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 9 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter 
Genocide Convention].  
52. Lemkin, supra note 47, at 79. See also Lemkin, supra note 46, at 229 
(“Genocide can be carried out through acts against individuals, when 
the ultimate intent is to annihilate the entire group composed of these 
individuals. . . .”). 
53. March 5th Execution Order, supra note 35, at 120 (alterations in 
original). 
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moral law. . . .”54 Generally speaking, this resolution reflects the 
nature of this crime as Lemkin perceived it. The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines the 
crime of genocide providing that genocide is a crime under 
international law. According to Article 2(a), genocide is an act 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, and involving killing members of 
the group.55 Unlike the resolution, the Convention enumerates the 
groups that can be subjected to genocide. It also removes from the list 
political groups, which were included in the resolution.56 What does 
come to the fore in the Convention—among the vast group of 
“other”—is the protection of national groups. The Convention also 
clarifies that genocide is an act intended to destroy specific groups “in 
whole or in part.”57 
In order to establish whether a given act falls within the definition 
of genocide, it is just as important to clarify the legal regulations, as 
it is to establish the real state of affairs. With regard to the latter, the 
decisive factor is the intent to destroy a group in whole or in part. 
Given the lack of access to Bolshevik Party documents and 
documents of the Soviet authorities, as well as the impossibility of 
questioning both the perpetrators and the witnesses of the Katyn 
Massacre, it is difficult to establish the intentions of the officials who 
ordered, organized, and committed the murders of Poles. But these 
are problems that international tribunals set up to try individuals 
accused of committing genocide have already faced.58 However, as 
Malcolm Shaw notes: 
The importance of establishing the specific intent to destroy the 
group in question in whole or in part was emphasised by the 
Yugoslav Tribunal in the Jelisić case, while it has been held 
with regard to the difficulties in establishing the critical intent 
54. G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(I) (Dec. 11, 1946) [hereinafter 
Genocide Resolution]. 
55. Id. art. 2.  
56. Compare Genocide Resolution, supra note 54 (“Many instances of such 
crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political or other 
groups have been destroyed . . . .”), with Genocide Convention, supra 
note 51, art. 2 (“[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, 
or religious group. . . .”).  
57. Genocide Convention, supra note 51, art. 2.  
58. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, 23 Fordham Int’l L.J. 286, 306–12 (1999) (describing the 
intent element of the crime of genocide, both theoretically and in 
practice).  
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requirement, the recourse may be had in the absence of 
confessions to inferences from facts.59 
In this, we must not confuse the intent with the motive. As Maria 
Szonert-Binienda rightly points out: 
In criminal law these are separate concepts. In order to 
demonstrate that Katyn was genocide under the 1948 
Convention, we must prove the intent to destroy the Polish 
national group. On the other hand, the question why the 
perpetrators had this intent, i.e. what their motive was, does 
not matter. The definition of genocide was deliberately 
constructed in such a way so as not to limit the motives of the 
perpetrators destroying a protected group. Just as the number 
of protected groups was reduced by listing them in the 
definition itself, the possible motives of the perpetrator were 
deliberately not listed. Already at that time the authors 
predicted that the perpetrators might try to defend themselves 
by citing political motives in order to demonstrate their actions 
were not genocidal in nature. The authors of the definition of 
genocide debated for a long time about the question of motive. 
The Soviet Union representatives insisted that the definition of 
genocide contained possible motives, which should be limited to 
national, racial, ethnic or religious motives—corresponding to 
the protected groups. However, other states did not agree to 
such a solution, warning even that it would be used as a pretext 
for avoiding responsibility for genocidal acts. For it is extremely 
easy to hide a genocidal motive behind a political one.60  
Thus, the USSR’s suggestion to limit the possible motives was 
rejected.61 The solution adopted in the end was the one proposed by 
Venezuela, in which motives were neither listed nor limited.62 
The Russian Federation is today trying to take advantage of this 
partial success achieved by the USSR. However, there are no reasons 
59. Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law 263–64 (5th ed. 2004) 
(citation omitted); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT 95-10-T, Judgment 
(Dec. 14 1999), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug 
/en/jel-tj991214e.pdf. 
60. Maria Szonert-Binienda, Sąd nad Katyniem, Nasz Dziennik (May 14–
15, 2011) at 8. 
61. Id. 
62. See 1 Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide 
Convention: The Travaux Preparatoires (2008) (providing more 
information on the process that occurred to finalize the 1948 
Convention); see also The UN Genocide Convention: A 
Commentary (Paola Gaeta ed., 2009); Elżbieta Karska, Manfred 
Lachs wobec ludobójstwa i zbrodni wojennych, in Manfred Lachs: 
Wybitny prawnik świata 377 (Zdzislaw Galicki et al. eds., 2011). 
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why the 1948 Genocide Convention should be redefined today. Under 
this Convention, we will not regard as genocide the physical 
destruction or attempt at destruction of a political group (e.g., 
Trotskyites) for political reasons. What will be regarded as genocide, 
however, will be the same act committed for political reasons with 
regard to a national, racial, ethnic or religious group. We must bear in 
mind the fact that the motives of the Soviet authorities, though 
mainly political, also involved, nevertheless, inciting and using 
aversion to the Poles as a nation. 
V. The Doctrine on the Classification of the Katyn 
Massacre Under International Law—An Outline 
As Adam Basak rightly concludes: 
[I]n the light of that . . . decision of the Soviet Politburo, there 
is no doubt that its intent was to destroy a part of the Polish 
national group; namely, the part made up of the nearly twenty-
six thousand representatives of the intellectual elite, selected 
because of their social status and social function.63  
That is why Cezary Mik writes about a “genocidal murder of the 
Polish elite in Katyn and other places.”64 Marian Flemming concludes, 
on the other hand, that the formulation of the concept of genocide 
and the attribution of normative content to it after the Katyn 
Massacre was committed means that the massacre must be classified 
in this category.65 He adds that the massacre was also a war crime.66 
63. See Adam Basak, Katyń: Problem odpowiedziałności karnej sprawców w 
świetle Norymbergi, in 21 Studia na Faszyzmem i Zbrodniami 
Hitlerowskimi 325, 325–60 (Karol Jonca ed., 1998). 
64. See Cezary Mik, Lech Aleksander Kaczyński (18.6.1949-10.4.2010), 1/2 
Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego 5, 10 (2010) (describing the life as 
well as public and academic work of the late Lech Kaczyński, President 
of Poland, who, while heading a Polish delegation for the celebrations of 
the seventieth anniversary of the Katyn Massacre, died along with the 
ninety-five people accompanying him on April 10, 2010 in a plane crash 
in Smolensk). In this context Mik notes that President Kaczyński:  
[B]elieved that partnership and friendship between nations had 
to be developed. At the same time he believed that this could be 
done provided that such actions were based on both the 
historical and contemporary truth. From this also stemmed the 
need to find out the truth about the genocidal murder of the 
Polish elite in Katyn and other places. 
 Id. 
65. See generally Marian Flemming, Jeńcy wojenni: Studium Prawno-
historyczne (2000). 
66. Id. at 324. 
717 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2013 
The Crime of Genocide Committed Against the Poles 
Karolina Kosińska, too, sees the Katyn Massacre as an element of the 
crime of genocide.67 Discussing the definition of this international 
crime, she states unequivocally: 
If we talk about a specific plan to destroy a group, we can 
undoubtedly point to the USSR’s policy with regard to the 
Polish lands that found themselves under Soviet rule after the 
Soviet attack. This policy was exactly such a plan, implemented 
through various genocidal acts against the Polish nation, acts 
the most spectacular of which was the Katyn Massacre.68 
On the other hand, Małgorzata Kuźniar-Plota—incidentally, a 
prosecutor in charge of the Polish investigation into the matter—
states that acts comprising the Katyn Massacre “had all the 
characteristics of the crime of genocide specified in Article 2 of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.”69 Witold Kulesza, who regards the massacre as both an act 
of genocide and a war crime, refers to it as “wartime genocide.”70 
Tadeusz Jasudowicz, in turn, makes a general statement, that during 
World War II the USSR committed “a series of horrible war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide.”71 He also 
concluded that the Katyn Massacre was “an act of Soviet genocide.”72 
During the conference Katyn: Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?, 
which took place at Case Western Reserve University School of Law 
in Cleveland, Ohio, on February 4–5, 2011, the view that the Katyn 
Massacre could also be regarded as an act of genocide was expressed 
by the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Stephen 
Rapp, and by the former Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, David M. Crane.73 William A. Schabas, on the other hand, 
pointed out that a court or tribunal hearing such a case would be 
under tremendous political pressure from the Russian Federation, 
67. Karolina Kosińska, Zbrodnia ludobójstwa w prawie 
międzynarodowym 34 (2009). 
68. Id.; see also Zdzisław Peszkowski & Grzegorz Jędrzejek, 
Zbrodnia Katyńska w Swietle Prawa 134 (2004). 
69. See Małgorzata Kuźniar-Plota, Kwalifikacja prawna Zbrodni 
Katyńskiej—Wybrane zagadnienia, in Zbrodnia Katyńska: W kRęgu 
Prawdy i Kłamstwa 46 (Sławomir Kalbarczyk ed., 2010). 
70. Kulesza, supra note 44, at 52. 
71. Jasudowicz, supra note 34, at 174. 
72. Tadeusz Jasudowicz, Zbrodnia Katyowicz, akt sowieckiego ludobojstwa, 
Sybirak 1990, at 9. 
73. See Michael P. Scharf & Maria Szonert-Binienda, Katyn: Justice 
Delayed or Justice Denied? Report of the Cleveland Experts’ Meeting, 
44 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 535 (2012).  
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which would make it difficult for it to give such a ruling.74 However, 
this is an extra-legal conclusion in the sense that a legal classification 
of an event is made in the context of a practical possibility of 
enforcing this internationally. Yet, possible objections of the other 
party and the difficulties—which are, after all, to be expected in any 
international dispute—cannot constitute an objective argument for a 
revision of the legal classification. 
What must be noted here is that a committee of experts set up by 
the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation on 
March 17, 1992 concluded that the Katyn Massacre was an act of 
genocide under international law.75 This group included lawyers, Boris 
Topornin (member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, director of its 
Institute of Law and the State) and Aleksandr Yakovlev (head of the 
Department of Criminal Law and Criminology at the Institute), as 
well as representatives of other disciplines, Inessa Yazhborovska 
(historian), Valentina Parsadanova (historian), Yuriy Zoria (military 
sciences) and Lev Belayev (medical sciences). A statement of August 
2, 1993, signed by all members of the committee reads, “The murder  
. . . of Poles has all the characteristics of genocide, the responsibility 
for which lies with Stalin, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, 
Kalinin, Kaganovich, Merkulov, Kobulov, Bashtakov and other 
individuals who committed the murder in practice.”76 The authors of 
the documents also add that: 
[A]n accurate legal assessment . . . of the crimes committed as 
part of the state-sanctioned terror should be based on the 
principles of international law developed in detail after World 
War II, the system of special norms of substantive and 
procedural law, with genocide and crimes against humanity 
being recognised as having taken place and as not being subject 
to the statute of limitations.77  
In addition, the authors concluded that these acts had also been 
war crimes.78 The committee also recommended that those who had 
74. See Szonert-Biniendą, supra note 61, at 8–9; see also Case Western 
Reserve School of Law, Katyn: Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?—
Was Katyn a Genocide?, YouTube (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=E3HAZeNsozk;  Case Western Reserve School of 
Law, Hon. Stephen Rapp at Conference on Katyn, YouTube (Feb. 4, 
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YpXo Kt9PBXw. 
75. The text of this decision is available in Rosja a Katyn 48–108 (Anna 
Dzienkiewicz  ed., 2010). 
76. Id. at 100.  
77. Id. at 103. 
78. When it comes to all people involved in the Katyn Massacre—from the 
highest echelons of the USSR to those who had actually committed the 
crimes—the conclusion was that “they committed acts of genocide, war 
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committed these crimes—listed by name—be arrested and tried before 
a Russian court.79 
The term genocide is also used by authors of non-legal 
publications. For instance, a distinguished Polish historian, Wojciech 
Materski refers to the Katyn Massacre as “genocide” and to the 
Politburo decision of March 5, 1940 as a “genocidal decision.”80 
Stanisław Jaczyński describes it as an act “ordering the crime of 
genocide.”81 The military historian Jędrzej Tucholski describes these 
actions as “the crime of mass genocide.”82 This opinion is shared by 
some Russian historians as well. For example, Lebedeva—in her 
monograph about the Katyn Massacre—writes about the “genocidal 
practices used by Stalin’s regime against the Polish nation.”83 The 
same view on the problem is expressed by a Canadian political 
scientist specializing in genocide, Adam Jones, who—when describing 
the Katyn Massacre—notes that, though terrifying, “[t]his was only a 
small part of a wider Soviet campaign against the Polish nation.”84 He 
points out that these authorities committed the crime of genocide 
against the Poles at the time.85 The American historian Norman 
Naimark emphasizes that the Katyn Massacre was only a part of a 
consistently implemented plan of genocide of Poles that had taken 
place in the USSR since the early 1930s.86 He even called in an 
emblematic case of Stalinist genocide.87 
In June 1952, Zdzisław Stahl wrote: 
During its deliberations, the American Congress, and especially 
members of the Katyn Committee of the House of 
Representatives were right in describing the mass murder 
committed in 1940 . . . as an act of genocide. The crime of 
genocide, made current by the total systems and still posing a 
crimes and crimes against humanity, which do not fall under the statute 
of limitations.” Id. at 101. 
79. Id. at 103. 
80. See Materski, supra note 37, at 220–21. 
81. Stanisław Jaczyński, Jeńcy Polscy w Związku Sowieckim, in Zbrodnie 
NKWD na obszarze województw wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej: materiały I Międzynarodowej Konferencji Naukowej 
140 (Boguslaw Polak ed., 1995). 
82. Tucholski, supra note 38, at 125. 
83. Lebedeva, supra note 7, at 283–84. 
84. Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction 199 (2nd 
ed. 2011). 
85. See id. at 131–34. 
86. See Naimark, supra note 6, at 135. 
87. Id. at 3. 
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real danger to the world as long as the Soviet tyranny lasts, has 
been defined anew and condemned by international law. . . . It 
has also been reflected in the Genocide Convention.88 
When quoting the definition of genocide as included in Article 2 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Stahl concluded that the Katyn Massacre fell within this 
definition.89 
As we can read in a monograph published by Stahl and Józef 
Mackiewicz, entitled The Katyn Massacre in the Light of Documents, 
with an introduction by General Władysław Anders: 
The above definition suggests the mass murder in Katyn must 
be classified as a classic example of the horrible crime of 
genocide. For the Polish prisoners were murdered in a 
premeditated fashion and according to a plan, and only because 
they were Poles, (i.e., with the intent of destroying a valuable 
part of the Polish nation). . . . The history of this crime testifies 
to this beyond any doubt      . . . . This blow was dealt in order 
to destroy the Polish nation (i.e., in order to commit the crime 
of genocide against this nation) by the government of the Soviet 
Union, which organized the mass murder in Katyn.90 
As Roman Kwiecień rightly notes, “For Poland, this is a crime 
under international law; for Russia—an ‘ordinary’ crime the statute of 
limitations of which has expired.”91 The Katyn Massacre cannot be 
perceived as a one-off act outside the historical and geopolitical 
context. It should be perceived as part of the policy of the Soviet 
authorities vis-à-vis the Poles as a nation—including the policy 
88. Zbrodnia Katyńska w Swietle Dokumentów 285 (Józef 
Mackiewicz & Zdzislaw Stahl eds., 10th ed. 1982).  
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 285–86. 
91. Roman Kwiecień, Przezwyciężanie przeszłości przez prawo 
międzynarodowe, in Problemy Prawne w Stosunkach Polsko-
Niemieckich u Progu XXI Wieku 35 (Czapliński Wladyslaw &  
Łukańko Bernard eds., 2010). For instance, after the Chief Military 
Prosecutor of the Russian Federation rejected, in 2009, successive 
motions by the families of the victims of the Katyn Massacre to 
declassify the files and rehabilitate the victims posthumously, the 
Military Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation–
rejecting complaints submitted by Russian lawyers–concluded that, in 
accordance with the 1926 Soviet Criminal Code, this crime, as a 
common crime, fell under the statute of limitations. See Andrzej 
Przewoźnik, Zbrodnia Katyńska: Proces Odkrywania Prawdy i 
Upamiętnienie Ofiar, in Białe Plamy–Czarne Plamy: Sprawy 
Trudne w Polsko-Rosyjskich Stosunkach 1918-2008, at 329 
(Adam Rotfeld et al. eds., 2010). 
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implemented in the USSR before the outbreak of World War II. The 
opening of archives and new scholarly publications allow us to add 
new facts to the legal assessment of the classification of these events. 
It must be stressed at this point that the acts committed by the 
perpetrators of the Katyn Massacre can be classified not only as acts 
of genocide, but can also be regarded as other international crimes, 
including war crimes. There are no legal obstacles to declaring one act 
as having the characteristics of two or more crimes.92 The conclusion 
that the Katyn Massacre is either an act of genocide or a war crime, 
and the juxtaposition of the two, does not find enough justification in 
law. This is not an exclusive disjunction. In this context it is worth 
bearing in mind the official and publicly expressed position of the 
Polish state formulated by the Prime Minister of Poland, Jerzy 
Buzek, who, during the opening of the Polish War Cemetery on June 
28, 2000, said that, “The word ‘Katyn’ will, for whole generations in 
Poland and in the whole world, signify genocide and a war crime.”93 
One act can have the characteristics of several types of crimes. 
Depending on the solution adopted by the legislator, the punishment 
is imposed for each of such crimes separately (ideal concurrence of 
offenses) or only for the crime carrying the highest penalty 
(eliminative concurrence of offenses). In the case of international 
crimes discussed here, given the fact that they involved the murder of 
people, they all carry the same maximum penalty, the highest penalty 
known to every legal system. There is no doubt, however, that among 
international crimes that can be attributed to the perpetrators of the 
Katyn Massacre the most serious is the crime of genocide.94 
This classification has been used from the very beginning of the 
official investigation of the Katyn Massacre and prosecution of its 
perpetrators by the Polish authorities after the transformations of 
1989. As early as October 1989, the Prosecutor General of the 
People’s Republic of Poland, Józef Żyta, submitted to the Prosecutor 
General of the USSR, Alexander Sukhariev, the first Polish request to 
92. See Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. 
Ct., Elements of Crimes, General Introduction ¶ 9, at 112, ICC-
ASP/1/3 (Sep. 9, 2002), available at http://www.amicc.org/ 
docs/Elements_of_Crimes_120704EN.pdf (“A particular conduct may 
constitute one or more crimes.”). 
93. Jerzy Buzek, Prime Minister of Poland, Speech at the Ceremonial 
Opening of the Polish War Cemetery at Katyn (July 28, 2000), in Anna 
M. Cienciala et al., Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment 350, 
351 (2007). 
94. See Karol Karski, The Katyn Crime under Nuremberg Principles, in 
Katyn: State-Sponsored Extermination 31–32 (Maria Szonert-
Binienda ed., 2012).  
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launch an investigation into the case.95 In describing the basis for the 
request, he invoked the duties of this state under the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and 
the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity of 1968, Article 1, of 
which states that:  
No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, 
irrespective of the date of their commission: (a) war crimes . 
. . (b) crimes against humanity . . . and the crime of genocide 
as defined in the 1948 Convention . . . even if such acts do 
not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country 
in which they were committed.96 
The European Court of Human Rights in the Chamber judgment 
of April 16, 2012 in Janowiec and Others v. Russia (concerning the 
effectiveness of the Russian investigation into the Katyn Massacre) 
confirmed that the murder committed on Polish prisoners was a war 
crime. 97 In so doing, the Tribunal did not negate that this action was 
also a crime of genocide or a crime against humanity. It analyzed 
whether it was one of the types of crime for which prosecution is not 
subject to a statute of limitations. It established this with the 
simplest example, showing that in 1939 during the use of the Soviet-
Polish armed conflict, war crime occurred. Nothing more—to justify 
the argument that it is a crime—for which the 1968 Convention on 
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity is applicable—is needed, so nothing more 
was done. In the same verdict, the Tribunal also named the Holocaust 
a crime against humanity. Yet in so doing, it did not negate that it 
was also a crime of genocide. 
95. Kalendarium Zbrodni Katyńskiej [Timeline of the Katyn Massacre], 
onet.pl (Apr. 10, 2010), http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/kalendarium-
zbrodni-katynskiej,1,3571752,wiadomosc.html. 
96. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity art. 1, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 
U.N.T.S. 73. 
97. Janowiec v. Russia, Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, Chamber, Judgment 
of Apr. 16, 2012, available at  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra 
/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110513. The judgment still is not final, 
because the parties may request within three months from the date of 
the judgment that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber, in 
accordance with Article 44 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This case is 
now before the Grand Chamber.  
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VI. The Policy of the Soviet Authorities with Regard 
to the Poles and the Polish Nation 
There are suggestions that the Poles in the USSR were not 
treated as one nation, and that the repressions affected only some of 
them, those that the Soviet authorities found convenient. However, 
the facts are against such a conclusion. A description of one of the 
waves of mass deportations of Polish families in 1940 can be found, 
for instance, in Beata Obertyńska’s reminiscences, recorded during the 
war:  
They knew that the only way to “depolonize Poland” was to 
deprive it of Poles. So they concocted a devilishly perfidious 
plan not to take away a country from people but people from a 
country. The plan was carried out suddenly, deviously, one 
night over the entire occupied territory. . . . Suddenly, at night, 
the surprised village got half an hour to assemble, after which 
its entire population, put on sledges, was driven for miles, in 
biting cold, and then was put on trains. No one was left alone. 
Old men and infants, cripples and cretins were among those 
taken. Women in labour were chased off their beds and told to 
get on the sledges. The bedridden and the paralysed were 
dragged too. Not a living soul had the right to remain in a 
village or settlement condemned to extinction. Their cattle and 
livestock from then on automatically belonged to the state, 
forming the germs of the future collective farms. The victims 
were, first of all, purely Polish villages and settlements, as well 
as soldiers’ settlements in the borderlands.98  
This is a typical description not of political but of ethnic 
cleansing. In the USSR at that time, all Poles were politically suspect 
and what decided who among them was to be the first victim and 
according to what “sub-criteria” was the specific, murderous whim of 
the Soviet authorities.99 As we can read in the monograph The Katyn 
Massacre in the Light of Documents: 
In the Bolsheviks’ colloquial parlance—and those who had the 
grim opportunity to be under Soviet rule, especially in the 
hands of the NKVD, must have heard this technical term—the 
98. Beata Obertyńska, W Domu Niewoli 288–89 (2d ed. 1968).  
99. Regardless of whims and “sub-criteria,” the end result was the same. Cf. 
Donald Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen: The Tyrant and 
Those Who Killed for Him 310–11 (2004) (“Poles, Finns, Estonians, 
and Latvians were singled out [for arrest and likely execution] to the 
extent that the USSR in 1937 had half as many ethnic Poles and Balts 
as it had in 1926. Virtually all ethnic Poles–some 144,000–were arrested 
and three quarters of these were shot.”). 
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operation of destroying the leading elements of a nation 
conquered by communism is called ‘obezkholovenye’ 
[decapitation], (i.e., depriving society of its head and, 
consequently, spiritual leadership). . . . The germs of genocidal 
plans are also to be found in the fundamental theories of Soviet 
communism. . . . We find them . . . in the Stalinist theory of 
nationality with its principle of “culture—national in its form 
and socialist in its content” providing a convenient theoretical 
foundation for the destruction of any nation under Soviet rule 
with the destroyed nation allowed to keep the external marks of 
independence and separateness. For the Sovietization process 
destroys the roots of national individuality and source of 
civilizational power, while leaving the external marks and 
forms.100 
The Secretary of the Council for the Protection of Struggle and 
Martyrdom Sites of the Republic of Poland, Andrzej Przewoźnik, has 
reminded us that, “Having attacked Poland, the Nazi and the Soviet 
regimes, which had formed an alliance in August 1939, began to carry 
out their programmes of ‘destroying the leadership of the Polish 
nation’ (Germans) and ‘obezkholovenye’ (Soviets).”101 Both states 
decided to subjugate the Polish nation by depriving it of its leading, 
culture-creating parts. Materski notes that, “What both [occupying 
powers] had in common was deliberate destruction of the Polish 
intellectual elite.”102 As the then-ally of the USSR, Adolf Hitler said in 
autumn 1939, “Only the nation whose leaders have been destroyed 
can be turned into a nation of slaves.”103 A recently discovered note 
by Beria suggests that the number of Polish nationals arrested by 
Soviet authorities just between September 1939 and December 1, 1940 
was 409,000.104 
Organized campaigns against Poles were instigated in the USSR 
even before the outbreak of World War II. As Lebedeva points out:  
Fight[ing] against entire nations and nationalities became an 
organic component of the policy of eliminating ‘hostile’ and 
‘socially dangerous’ elements and spreading its rule over ever 
more new territories. The first victim of this policy was the 
100. Zbrodnia Katyńska w Swietle Dokumentów, supra note 88, at 
287–88. 
101. Andrzej Przewoźnik, W hołdzie ludziom nauki, in Jolanta Adamska 
et al., Reżimy totalitarne wobec ludzi nauki 1939-1945: 
Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Sonderaktion Krakau, Zbrodnia 
Katyńska 3 (2007).  
102. Materski, supra note 37, at 201. 
103. Hermann Rauschning, Gespräche mit Hitler 3 (1940). 
104. Materski, supra note 37, at 203. 
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Polish nation. In April 1936 the Council of People’s Commissars 
adopted a top secret resolution, no. 776-120 ss, On resettling 
politically suspect Poles from the Ukrainian SSR to the Kazakh 
SSR. The resulting repressions affected 30,000 families from 
Marchlewski and Dzerzhynsky Raions. Between 1922 and 1925 
Poles from all parts of the country were brought there to 
autonomous national raions created by the Soviet authorities. 
However, the rejection by those Poles of collective farming led 
not only to the disbanding of the Marchlewski Raion in 1935 
and the Dzerzhynsky Raion in 1938 but also to the persecution 
of the Polish community.105 
Naimark, too, notes that the actions of the Soviet authorities 
against Poles immediately after the outbreak of World War II did not 
result from any new policy. The territorial spread of Soviet rule only 
led to another part of the Polish nation being covered by it. Thus, the 
Soviets continued their existing genocidal policy towards this nation. 
Naimark stresses that: 
The attack [of the Soviet authorities] against specific “hostile” 
nations was in some cases genocidal in its form. Early in the 
1930s those nationalities that had ostensible homelands 
abroad—the Poles, Germans and Koreans in particular—were 
separated out from the rest of the Soviet national groupings and 
deemed inherently dangerous to the Soviet state. In particular, 
the actions against the Poles, starting with mass deportations to 
the special settlements in 1934, and culminating in the arrests 
and deportations of 1939–1940 and the Katyn Massacre of June 
1940, can be thought of as genocidal.106 
The punishing of entire nations reached its height in 1944. The 
destruction and deportations affected, among others, the Ingrian 
Finns living near Leningrad, the Kalmyks from the Caspian Sea, the 
Chechens and the Ingush, people living in the Karachay Republic in 
the Caucasus, Crimean Tatars, and several thousand Greeks, who had 
settled on the peninsula centuries earlier.107 In order to carry out mass 
deportations, the Soviet authorities created permanent new structures 
within the Soviet NKVD, including the Convoy Troops of the NKVD. 
It is worth bearing in mind that there is a surviving letter from 
Lemkin to August Heckscher II from 1951, in which Lemkin used the 
term genocide to refer to the mass deportations conducted by the 
Soviet authorities of the Volga Germans in 1941, and of the Crimean 
105. Lebedeva, supra note 7, at 296. 
106. Naimark, supra note 6, at 135. 
107. See Jones, supra note 84, at 134–35; Naimark, supra note 6, at 135–36; 
Sanford, supra note 11, at 86. 
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Tatars, Chechens, the Ingush, Karachays, and Balkars in 1944 to 
1945.108 This is worth noting because Lemkin did not include members 
of political groups, persecuted for political reasons, among the victims 
of genocide.109 It seems, however, that he believed that the destruction 
of nations for political and not only racial reasons did deserve to be 
classified as such.110 For him, political groups were not protected by 
the 1948 Convention, although he did want to provide that protection 
at the Convention preparation stage.111 However, he did not protest 
too much against the removal of political groups from its definition, 
because of the Convention. Yet, he was right in maintaining that in 
the light of an already adopted international agreement, when a 
national group was physically eliminated “in whole or in part” for 
political reasons, such a situation did fall within the definition 
included in the agreement.  
It has to be said at this point that the so-called Polish operation 
conducted by the NKVD caused the destruction of around 30% of the 
total number of Poles living in the USSR at the time. As scholars 
point out, “Poles, persecuted and punished by the authorities, came 
to the very top of the list of the persecuted. They were subjected to 
destruction more than others, and were also the first to be treated in 
this manner for reason of their nationality.”112 
Lemkin’s authority is invoked by, for instance, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Appeals Chamber 
judgement of March 22, 2006 in the case of Milomir Stakić.113 The 
Tribunal affirmed the words of the “scholar who first conceptualised 
the term,” according to which genocide signifies “a co-ordinated plan 
of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations 
of the life of national groups,” with the aim of annihilating the groups 
themselves.114 In addition, the Tribunal stated that according to the 
author of the term, the perpetrator’s objective “would be 
108. See John Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the 
Genocide Convention 216–17 (2008); Courtois, supra note 15, at 
122.  
109. See Cooper, supra note 108, at 90–91. 
110. See id. at 81 (stating that Lemkin included national and racial groups 
as victims of genocide). 
111. See id.  
112. Kucharski, supra note 26, at 58. 
113. Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 21–22 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf (“This 
reading of Article 4 finds support in the etymology of the term 
‘genocide,’ and in the definition of the crime given by Raphaël Lemkin, 
the scholar who first conceptualised the term.”). 
114. Id. ¶ 21. 
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disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, 
language, national feelings, religion, the economic existence of national 
groups.”115 
We should remember that both the Third Reich and the USSR 
pursued the policy of depriving the Poles of their national rights.116 In 
a secret additional protocol to the non-aggression pact between 
Germany and the USSR of August 23, 1939 (Ribbentrop-Molotov 
Pact), the sphere of influence over the territory of Poland was divided 
in the context of a question posed in the document of “whether the 
interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an 
independent Polish state . . .” as well as the statement that this 
question would be resolved by future will of the contracting powers, 
expressed “by means of a friendly agreement.”117 Following a 
suggestion submitted by the USSR on September 19, 1939, Germany 
agreed to a total liquidation of Poland as a state. This was reflected 
in the agreement on friendship and the border between the USSR and 
Germany of September 28, 1939.118 The Polish state was to cease to 
exist once and for all. 
The Soviets did not provide for any formal conditions of the 
existence of a separate Polish national grouping or nationality within 
the territory annexed by the USSR. For instance, they did not 
establish a Polish-Soviet republic, like they did in 1940 with regard to 
the annexed territories of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, or parts 
taken from Romania (Moldavian SSR) and Finland (Karelo-Finnish 
SSR).119 The annexed lands of the Second Polish Republic were 
incorporated directly into the Belarussian SSR and Ukrainian SSR.120 
Nor did the Soviets create—within these latter two—a Polish 
autonomous republic or a Polish autonomous district, though such a 
115. Id. 
116. Tadeusz Jasudowicz, Od Tragedii Katyńskiej do Tragedii Smoleńskiej–z 
perspektywy prawa miedzynarodowego i standardów praw człowieka, in 1 
Fides et bellum: Księga poświęcona Pamięci Księdza Biskupa, 
Profesora, Generała śp. Tadeusza Płoskiego 13-25 (Bronisław 
Sitek, Tadeusz Jasudowicz &Martyna Seroka eds., 2012) 
117. See Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics with Secret Additional Protocol, U.S.S.R.-Ger., art. 
II, Aug. 23, 1939. 
118. See Boundary and Friendship Treaty Between Germany and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, U.S.S.R.-Ger., art. II, Aug. 28, 1939. 
119. See Snyder, supra note 1, at 128 (providing a map of the division of 
Poland and the surrounding Republics, as well as a discussion of that 
division); James E. McSherry, Stalin, Hitler, and Europe: The 
Imbalance of Power 1939-1941, at 10–16 (1970) (explaining the 
detailed treaty provisions between the Soviet Union and Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania). 
120. See Snyder, supra note 1, at 128.  
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solution was known in the Soviet constitutional system.121 The fact 
that—contrary to the prevailing standard at the time—no 
administrative Polish unit was created in the USSR in 1939 
demonstrates that the status of Poles was lower than that of 
nationalities with their own Soviet republics or autonomous districts. 
That nations with “their place on the map” of the USSR were, too, 
subjected to murderous repression cannot change the fact that such a 
place was not even earmarked for the Poles. 
The Poles were not a nation that was supposed to continue to 
exist and maintain its identity, even to the extent known in Soviet 
practice and law.122 Its members were to be deprived of their national 
identity, while their culture-creating leaders and those who resisted 
were to be murdered. The Poles were victims of mass repressions.123 
Their Polish citizenship was disregarded. They were given Soviet 
citizenship en bloc. They were arrested, sent to the Gulag camps, and 
forcibly conscripted into the Soviet army, where they had to swear 
allegiance to the Soviet Nation, Soviet Fatherland, and the Workers’ 
and Peasants’ Government.124 “The Poles—regardless of their domicile 
at the time—were to be sent to . . . military districts” outside the 
annexed territories.125 “The soldiers who would not let their Polish 
patriotism be eradicated,” and would show that either actively or 
passively, “exposed themselves to repressions on the part of the secret 
service.”126 
121. For more on the constitutional and international aspects of territorial 
division of the USSR, see generally Karol Karski, Międzynarodowe 
Aspekty Prawnego Statusu Republik Związkowych ZSRR 
(1991). 
122. See Tadeusz Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust 10 (1998) 
(discussing Soviet policy’s goal of “eliminating all traces of that county’s 
[history]”); 2 Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of 
Poland 327 (discussing the new territories and their “democratic 
elections” performed as part of the Byelorussian SSR and the Ukrainian 
SSR). 
123. See Snyder, supra note 1, at 128–29 (explaining the NKVD’s mass 
deportation of Polish citizens and their families); Piotrowski, supra 
note 122, at 11–12 (discussing the Soviets’ crushing economic polices 
placed on Polish nationals). 
124. See Snyder, supra note 1, at 128–29 (discussing the deportation and 
conscription of Polish nationals); James E. McSherry, Stalin, 
Hitler, and Europe: The Imbalance of Power 1939–1941 at 105–
06 (1970) (discussing the conscription process). 
125. Albin Głowacki, Przymusowo wcieleni do Armii Czerwonej, w tym 
pełniący służbę w tzw. strojbatalionach, in  Polska 1939–1945: 
Straty osobowe i ofiary represji pod dwiema okupacjami 254–
55 (Wojciech Materski & Tomasz Szarota eds., 2009). 
126. Id.  
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Between 1940 and 1941, citizens of the Second Polish Republic 
who were Poles were subjected to mass deportations. A “total of over 
1,200,000 Polish citizens, mainly Poles” were deported in four mass 
transports during that period.127 For instance, among those deported 
in the first transport, between February 8 and February 10, 1940, 
82% were Polish.128 The number of Polish citizens of all nationalities 
deported to the USSR is estimated at 1.4-1.5 million, 1.2 million of 
those being ethnic Poles.129 Thus, Poles constituted as much as 80–
86% of all the deported, though they constituted less than half—just 
38%—of people living in the territories annexed by the USSR.130 In 
referring to the subsequent waves of deportations, Lebedeva calls 
them collectively “deportations of the Poles from western Ukraine and 
Belarus.”131 She also adds that “[p]ercentage-wise, the number of the 
displaced was no lower than that in areas occupied by the Third 
Reich.”132 Historians note that “the Soviet attack was directed mainly 
at the leaders of the Polish nation” and that the actions were to 
“weaken the Polish element in the Eastern Borderlands.”133  
This genocide was not an exception but a manifestation of the 
working of the Soviet system: 
The Soviet system . . . cannot maintain its hold over nations 
with individuality and culture; in order to hold on to power, it 
must turn nations into a shapeless mass of terrorised slaves. . . . 
The Soviet practice with regard to the Polish nation can—in 
addition to the murder of prisoners—‘boast’ a number of other 
genocidal acts, making up a consistent whole of a cruel plan to 
destroy the Polish nation. During the first occupation of the 
eastern part of Poland, following the joint attack with Hitler in 
1939, Moscow managed, over less than two years of governing 
127. 3 Historical Commission of the Polish General Staff, Polskie 
Siły Zbrojne w drugiej wojnie światowej: Armia Krajowa 33–34 
(1950). 
128. Głowacki, supra note 125, at 241. 
129. See Piotrowski, supra note 122, at 13–14.  
130. At that time, 11% of the population of the territory annexed by the 
USSR was deported. See id. (expressing that out of 1.4–1.5 million 
deported approximately 1.2 million were calculated as ethnically Polish). 
Czesław Partacz, Losy ludności rodzimej na Kresach Wschodnich w 
czasie pierwszej okupacji sowieckiej 1939–1941, in Zbrodnie NKWD 
na obszarze województw wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej: materiały I Międzynarodowej Konferencji Naukowej 
70, 76 (Boguslaw Polak ed., 1995). See also Włodzimierz Bonusiak, 
Polska podczas II wojny światowej 108, 113, 123 (1995). 
131. Lebedeva, supra note 7, at 159. 
132. Id. at 285. 
133. Partacz, supra note 130, at 72. 
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half of Poland, to deport over 1.5 million of the best elements of 
the local population, totalling 13 million people. Thus over 10% 
of the population of eastern Poland—and culturally the most 
active part at that—was doomed to extinction or, at best, to 
vegetation or deprivation of national identity.134 
Also, some Russian scholars studying the crimes of Stalin’s era—
including Lebedeva—admit that the treatment of the Poles by the 
Soviet authorities was influenced by their nationality (i.e., being 
Polish was an incriminating circumstance).135 The attitude of the 
Soviet authorities to the Poles can be seen, for instance, in a proposal 
submitted by the People’s Commissar for Defence, Grigoriy Kulik, on 
September 21, 1939, to Stalin, regarding “the release of Belarusian 
and Ukrainian prisoners,” but not Polish prisoners.136 Lebedeva points 
to the arrests of Poles. She stresses that these arrests:  
[W]ere not isolated excesses of overzealous NKVD officers, but 
were a result of a carefully planned policy of destroying the 
representatives of the Polish statehood, a policy that began to 
be pursued long before Katyn, Kharkhov and Mednoye. The 
idea was to demolish the foundations of the Polish state and its 
culture. The arrests were overseen by the central authorities. In 
December [1939], for instance, they ordered the arrest of all 
reserve officers, also those that had retired, and shortly before in 
the war [of 1941] the arrests included people from central and 
western parts of Poland.137 
Petrov explains why the Poles murdered at the time were not, for 
instance, sent to forced labor camps, where, after all, they would not 
be able to do any harm to the Soviet authorities. As the Russian 
scholar notes:  
134. Zbrodnia Katyńska w Swietle Dokumentów, supra note 88, at 
286–87. 
135. Lebedeva, supra note 7, at 287. 
136. Id. at 68, 85–86; Materski, supra note 37, at 216–17; Tucholski, supra 
note 38, at 133–34. For more on the treatment of Poles in areas annexed 
by the USSR, see e.g., Albin Głowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków 
na ziemiach wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej 1939-1941 (1998); 
Alexander Guryanov, Sowieckie represje wobec Polaków i obywateli 
polskich w latach 1936-1956 w świetle danych sowieckich, in Europa 
nieprowincjonalna: przemiany na ziemiach wschodnich dawnej 
Rzeczypospolitej (Białoruś, Litwa, Łotwa, Ukraina, wschodnie 
pogranicze III Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) w latach 1772-1999, 
(Krzysztof Jasiewicz ed., 1999); Krzysztof Jasiewicz, Obywatele polscy 
aresztowani na terytorium tzw. Zachodniej Białorusi w latach 1939-1941 
w świetle dokumentacji NKWD/KGB, Kwartalnik Historyczny, 
1994, at 105–34. 
137. Lebedeva, supra note 7, at 287. 
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Stalin thought otherwise. For him, those young, very well-
educated and very patriotic Poles were Poland itself. Little 
crystals or, rather, seeds that would sprout wherever they would 
be thrown. They would return to Poland and create Poland in 
it. Sent to Voronezh or Magadan, they would build Poland 
there. And for Stalin, after September 1939 your state was to be 
no more. He agreed that within the territory of the former 
Second Polish Republic there would remain a mass of ordinary 
people he would be able to mould into whatever he chose.138 
Historical publications compare the fates of various victims: 
[S]ome of the best scholars—not only in Poland but also in the 
world—became victims of [both] totalitarian regimes. The 
Kraków Gestapo wrote down just one cause of the arrest: 
Aktion gegen Univers. Professoren [action against university 
professors], while the Political Bureau of the Central Committee 
of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) condemned to 
death 25,700 Polish citizens as “diehard, inveterate enemies of 
the Soviet authorities.139  
It is worth noting here that the extermination of the Polish 
intellectual elite happened simultaneously on either side of the 
German-Soviet partition border.140 Some authors, when comparing the 
German Nazi and the Stalinist crimes, point out that in some respects 
the Stalinist regime was even more criminal than its German Nazi 
equivalent. For example, according to Marek Rezler: 
The murder of the Polish POWs from the three camps was 
completely different in nature to the extermination in the Nazi 
concentration camps or the Soviet labour camps. The attack 
was deliberate and—as it turned out—effective, because the 
murdered officers were often part of the elite of Polish science, 
medicine, culture and politics.141 
Rezler also notes that this was unique, at least when it comes to 
World War II, as there were no other cases of deliberate 
138. Nikita Petrov, Katyń to logiczna zbrodnia Stalina (interview conducted 
by Wacław Radziwinowicz), Gazeta Wyborcza, Mar. 5, 2010, at 2. 
139. Przewoźnik, supra note 101, at 3. Neil Ascherson calls the Katyn 
Massacre “an act of selective genocide against a part of the Polish 
national elite, closely parallel to Hitler’s order to exterminate the Polish 
intellectual class.” Neil Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland 124 
(1987). 
140. Lebedeva, supra note 7, at 140. 
141. Marek Rezler, Kilka uwag o realiach katyńskiej historiografii, in 
Zbrodnie NKWD na obszarze województw wschodnich 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 161 (Boguslaw Polak ed., 1995). 
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extermination of an entire camp, not to mention three camps at the 
same time. He adds: 
Even the Germans, who had a specific extermination plan, 
provided for a similar action only after they had won the war. 
By liquidating the Kozelsk, Starobelsk and Ostashkov camps, 
the Soviet leaders assumed from the very beginning that the 
decisions sanctioning the division of the Polish state were final; 
they did not consider a possibility of the rebuilding of Poland or 
a military conflict in which the newly imprisoned Polish officers 
would become useful—not to mention their becoming allies.142 
In his analysis Rezler points to features common to different acts 
of genocide. He observes that:  
Just like the Germans in their decisions made during the 
Wannsee Conference confirmed their ‘final solution to the 
Jewish question’, so too the Kremlin, at the turn of 1939 and 
1940, decided to finally resolve the question of the Polish elite 
that had found themselves in its power. This led to the pits of 
death in the Katyn Forest, in Piatykhatky and Mednoye, as 
well as the camps in Siberia and the Polish settlements in 
Kazakhstan.143 
The author also notes that the Katyn Massacre is not just a 
tragic event that took place in the past and can be analysed today 
only as a one-off event, as an act, which, although terrible, is in its 
consequences solely historical. The criminal effects of the Massacre are 
still felt today. As Rezler wrote, “[t]he results of these decisions 
combined with the effects of the actions of the western invader, can 
still be seen in Poland today, and it will take several generations to 
fill those gaps; an avalanche of university degrees as well as high-level 
positions or financial status are not enough.”144 These words, spoken 
and written down in 1995, are to a large extent still valid today. A 
similar view is expressed by Grzegorz Łukomski. He notes that in the 
case of both invaders we were dealing with:  
[P]lanned and mass extermination. Universities played a special 
role in the occupying powers’ plans. The losses among the 
intellectual elite and intellectuals—unlike material losses—are 
immeasurable and the most difficult to compensate. The mass 
murders committed by both invaders in Polish science and 
culture created a huge generational gap and the effects of the 
losses can still be felt today. For the murders not only broke the 
142. Id.  
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
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continuity of research work and programmes; first and foremost, 
they caused an irretrievable loss of distinguished, often brilliant 
individuals, who represented nearly all areas of knowledge and 
human intellectual activity.145  
Both the German Nazis and the Soviets would murder the Polish 
intellectual elite first. 
We often hear that the Poles were treated as an objective political 
opponent and not as a national opponent. Some claim that repression 
against members of the nation was directed at specific individuals for 
political reasons. Even if this had been the case, which is by no means 
obvious, this does not change the fact that these individuals as a 
nation were regarded collectively as an element resisting 
Sovietization.146 Does it really matter that the Polish nation as a 
whole was regarded as a politically suspect element? According to the 
definition of the crime of genocide, it does not. Rather, it seems to 
confirm the argument that actions directly against the Polish nation 
took place in the USSR. 
Not all Polish prisoners of the Soviet POW camps were murdered; 
some individuals survived.147 Yet the view that this is an argument for 
concluding that the “massacre was political and not genocidal in 
nature” is not justified.148 In the German Nazi concentration camps, 
too, there were isolated cases of representatives of nations subjected 
to genocide leaving the camps for various reasons.149 This may have 
been caused by external interventions, both political and financial 
145. Grzegorz Łukomski, Straty wśród kadry naukowej oraz absolwentów i 
studentów Uniwersytetu Poznańskiego poniesione na Kresach 
Wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej 1939-1945, in Zbrodnie NKWD na 
obszarze województw wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
241 (Boguslaw Polak ed., 1995). 
146. When investigating the “counterrevolutionary” activities of various 
prisoners, the NKVD officers “would take particular care when recording 
all statements defending the honour of Poland and its government . . . 
and expressing religious feelings.” Lebedeva, supra note 7, at 148. 
147. See Snyder, supra note 1, at 135–36.  
148. See Karolina Wierczyńska, Pojęcie Ludobójstwa w Kontekście 
Orzecznictwa Międzynarodowych Trybunałów Karnych ad 
Hoc 195 (2010). 
149. See, e.g., Mieczysław (Mietek) Pemper, Der rettende Weg. 
Schindlers Liste – die wahre Geschichte. Aufgezeichnet von 
Viktoria Hertling und Marie Elisabeth Müller, 205–6 (2005) 
(describing the transfer of a group of 300 Jewish women from the 
Plaszow bei Krakau concentration camp thru the Auschwitz 
concentration and extermination camp to the Brünnlitz forced labor 
camp); Henryk Pierzchała, Pomocne dłonie Europejczyków 
(1939-1944) 298 and 447 (2005) (detailing the release of selected 
Polish professors from the Dachau and Sachsenhausen concentration 
camps). 
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(e.g., economical), or justified or unjustified expectations of the 
occupation authorities with regard to the usefulness of the various 
individuals to the regime. These almost incidental cases confirm the 
genocidal rule by virtue of their exceptional nature.150 Not all Poles, 
including soldiers, who found themselves under Soviet rule died.151 
However, in no case of genocide, did the perpetrators kill all members 
of a national or ethnic group to which they had access; nor did they 
always do so immediately after such a physical possibility had opened 
up.152 
What deserves recognition and support is the concept—included 
in the grounds for the decision to launch a Polish investigation into 
the Katyn Massacre—that the main motive behind the decision to 
execute Poles, motive expressed directly in the decision of the 
Politburo on March 5, 1940, is not what they had done in the past 
but what they could do in the future. Kuźniar-Plota writes, 
“Therefore, the proposal to murder [the Poles] was a preventive 
measure intended to prevent the rebirth of Polish national aspirations 
which, obviously, had to be directed also against the USSR as an 
aggressor and invader, and therefore possessed an ‘anti-Soviet’ 
dimension.”153 
Another argument against the Katyn Massacre being regarded as 
genocide is the fact that the victims included not only Poles but also 
some individuals of other nationalities, including Jews, Ukrainians, 
and Belarusians.154 The Poles constituted a vast majority of the 
people that were kept in POW camps and prisons and subsequently 
150. For more on the various reasons how 395 prisoners saved their lives, see, 
e.g., Sławomir Kalbarczyk, Zbrodnia Katyńska po 70 latach: krótki 
przegląd ustaleń historiografii, in Zbrodnia Katyńska: W Kręgu 
Prawdy i Kłamstwa 19 (Sławomir Kalbarczyk ed., 2010); J. Kurtyka, 
Polska 1939–1945. Straty osobowe i ofiary represji pod 
dwiema okupacjami, at VIII (Wojciech Materski & Tomasz Szarota 
eds., 2009); Natalia S. Lebedeva, Zbrodnia Katyńska: Proces odkrywania 
prawdy i upamiętniania ofiar, in Białe Plamy–Czarne Plamy: 
Sprawy Trudne w Polsko-Rosyjskich Stosunkach 1918-2008, at 
348–49. (Adam Rotfeld et al. eds., 2010) (noting that many of the saved 
prisoners were released on request of German and Lithuanian embassies 
as persons of their national origin). 
151. See, e.g., Snyder supra note 1, at 153.  
152. Soviet Crimes Against Poland During the Second World War, On the 
Occasion of the Commemoration of the 65th Anniversary of the Katyn 
Forrest Massacre: St. Paul University, Ottawa, April 21, 2009, 
Electronic Museum (April 21, 2005), http://www.electronicmuse 
um.ca/Poland-WW2/soviet_crimes/soviet_crimes_eng.html (“[I]n the 
case of Katyn, we have a national group (the Poles), which was 
destroyed ‘in part.’”).  
153. Decision to Commence Investigation, supra note 37.  
154. See id. 
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murdered.155 Subjected to extermination, they were treated as 
members of the Polish nation in the ethnic sense of the term or as 
people who supported or could support the Polish nation in its state-
building activities. In addition to an ethic concept of the “Polish 
nation” there is also its formal meaning. As Kuźniar-Plota has 
indicated,  
It has to be noted that Poland at the time was a multi-national 
state in which coexisted representatives of various nationalities 
treated by the law as ‘ethnic elements’ of the Polish nation. 
This formulation was adopted by eminent Polish lawyers in a 
commentary on Article 152 of the 1932 Criminal Code (“Those 
who publicly malign or deride the Polish Nation or the Polish 
State. . . .”), with the legal term “Polish nation” encompassing 
all citizens of Poland regardless of their nationality.156 
This is a definition of nation adopted with regard to many states, 
especially those that are or were inhabited by a number of ethnic 
groupings (American nation, Yugoslav nation, Czechoslovak nation, 
etc.).157 We have to bear in mind that this is how we should 
understand the intent expressed in Article 2 of the Genocide 
Convention, which refers not only to national groups but also to 
ethnic and racial groups.158 Thus, they do not have to be equivalent 
terms. 
Let me now return to the old cliché that during the Stalinist 
period in the USSR, human life was not respected. The Soviet 
authorities acted in accordance with the principle that the death of 
several innocent people is better than one guilty individual surviving, 
regardless of what this guilt was supposed to signify in Stalin’s state. 
That is why the margin of those subjected to repressions was so wide. 
As has already been mentioned, the victims of the Katyn Massacre 
were not only ethnic Poles. Polish citizens of other ethnicities were 
killed at the time as well.159 For the Soviet authorities, Polish officers 
155. See id.  
156. See id. For more on the definition of the term “nation” as all citizens of 
a state in the Polish legislation and the legislations of other states at the 
time, see, e.g., Juliusz Makarewicz, Kodeks karny z 
komentarzem 402–04 (5th ed. 1939) and Leon Peiper, Komentarz 
do kodeksu karnego, prawa o wykroczeniach, przepisów 
wprowadzających obie te ustawy 322–25 (2d ed. 1936). 
157. In this context we can also point to a state which is ethnically relatively 
homogenous. A member of the French nation is every person holding 
French citizenship, regardless of his or her ethnic affiliation (for example 
Arab). 
158. Genocide Convention, supra note 51, art. 2. 
159. See Decision to Commence Investigation, supra note 37.  
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were contaminated with “Polishness”—they were a Polish state-
building element. It seems that the Soviets concluded it would be 
better if everyone died, even if some were Belarusians, Ukrainians, or 
Jews. The executioners themselves referred to all the victims 
collectively as “the Poles,” because for them they were the Poles.160 It 
is all the more important given the fact that in case law the decisive 
factor in classifying a crime as genocide is how the perpetrator 
perceived the group being destroyed. If we assumed that in order to 
classify a crime as genocide, the uniformity of the group criterion had 
to be met 100% for the group to be deemed protected, the accused 
could always find someone who does not belong to the group to avoid 
responsibility. Thus, we could in practice question any group being 
classified as protected. 
As mentioned above, the executioners themselves as well as other 
NKVD officers and collaborators—in their statements recorded in 
official documents written during the genocide161 and made during 
hearings that took place already in the Russian Federation162—usually 
referred to all victims, using the collective terms “the Poles.” This 
term was also often used in the materials of Nikolai Burdenko’s 
Extraordinary State Commission set up by the Soviet authorities to 
pin the blame for the massacre on the Germans.163 This description is 
also used by Russian historians today.164 As Lebedeva unequivocally 
says, “Katyn was . . . not only a heinous crime but also part of the 
crackdown on the Polish nation.”165 There is no doubt that the 
160. See id.  
161. Report of the Head Department VI of the NKVD’s Chief Directorate of 
Economics, Ivan Bezrukov, to Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal 
Affairs of the USSR, Bogdan Kobulov of March 23, 1940, in Lebedeva, 
supra note 7, at 165. 
162. Such a statement was made by, for instance, the former head of the 
Kaliningrad Directorate of the NKVD, Dmitri Tokarev, showing how 
the deputy people’s commissar for internal affairs of the USSR, 
Kolubov, described the exterminated during a meeting with heads and 
deputy heads of the NKVD’s organizational units concerning the 
organization of the “relief” of camps and prisons on March 14, 1940. 
D.S. Tokarev himself, when describing the executions, called all the 
victims “the Poles.” See id. at 157, 213. Those subjected to 
extermination were referred to collectively as “the Poles” also by the 
former officer of the NKVD prison in Smolensk, Pyotr Klimov. He did 
that in a statement made to the Commission for the Rehabilitation of 
Repression Victims in the Smolensk District. See id. at 210–11. 
Analogous statements were also made by a former member of the Soviet 
kitchen staff in the NKVD camp in Ostashkov, Maria Sidorova. 
Vladimir Abarinov, Katynskii labirint, 47–48 (1991).  
163. See Lebedeva, supra note 7, at 258–59. 
164. See id. at 189, 190, 211–12, 258. 
165. Id. at 277. 
737 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2013 
The Crime of Genocide Committed Against the Poles 
actions by the Soviet authorities and officials were directed against 
the Polish nation, both in the ethnic and in the formal sense. 
The policy of subjugating the Polish nation also involved physical 
destruction of its culture-creating class. The actions of both occupying 
powers can be compared in this respect. As noted in a publication by 
the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites about 
the extermination of the Jagiellonian University professors in 
Sonderaktion Krakau and about the Katyn Massacre, “What 
constituted a heavy blow and irretrievable loss not only to Polish 
society but also to the world civilization were the arrests and murders 
of eminent representatives of Polish science carried out by both 
occupying powers.”166 When analysing the attitude of the Soviet 
authorities to Polish officers, Zdzisław Jordanek wrote, “the imperial 
objectives were a decisive factor here. The Polish intellectual elite had 
to be removed to make it easier for the Polish nation to become 
enslaved and deprived of its national identity.”167 As Jędrzej 
Tucholski has remarked, the Katyn Massacre involved “a physical 
elimination of the imprisoned elite of an indomitable nation which for 
centuries had been causing trouble for the signatories of all four 
partitions of Poland.”168 For Tucholski, the massacre was one of the 
elements of: 
[T]he ordeal of Polish people who for nearly two years (17 
September 1939–22 June 1941) were subjected to the most 
severe repressions of the Soviet system. The motivation behind 
these repressions was obvious: to terrorise en bloc and then to 
drain the areas behind the River Bug of quality Polish element, 
with ruthless physical annihilation of those who—to apply the 
invader’s reasoning—were a potential threat.169 
 
Lebedeva writes, “The prisoners of Kozelsk, Starobelsk and 
Ostashkov constituted the country’s military and intellectual elite 
absolutely ready to join the fight for the restoration of their 
homeland’s independence.”170 She stresses that “after more than six 
months spent in the harsh prison conditions, they were broken neither 
mentally nor morally. They did not disavow their homeland, their 
166. Adamska et al., supra note 104, at 42.  
167. Jędrzej Jordanek, Założenia polityki hitlerowskiej i stalinowskiej wobec 
oficerów Wojska Polskiego, in Zbrodnie NKWD na obszarze 
województw wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 119 
(Boguslaw Polak ed., 1995). 
168. Tucholski, supra note 38, at 135. 
169. Id. at 125. 
170. Lebedeva, supra note 7, at 140–41. 
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religion or the political and moral principles they upheld.”171 Owen 
O’Malley, the British ambassador to the Polish government in exile in 
London, remarked that the Poles thought of the Katyn Massacre as 
an attempt to destroy the foundations of the future Polish statehood 
by means of destroying the force of the Polish nation.172 
Among the 25,700 Polish nationals exterminated on the basis of 
the March 5, 1940 Politburo order, there were not only army officers 
but also officers of other uniformed services as well as civilians.173 The 
prisoners kept in the Ostashkov camp included priests, people working 
in the judicial system and settlers.174 Among them there were also 
reserve officers who, after graduating from high school, were called up 
into the army and after a year-long course at an officer cadet school 
received the rank of second reserve lieutenant.175 Among the reserve 
officers of the Polish Armed Forces were “members of parliament and 
senators, academics (professors and associate professors), government 
officials, teachers of various types of schools, doctors and pharmacists, 
lawyers (judges, prosecutors, barristers and solicitors), engineers and 
technicians, writers and journalists, artists and poets, chaplains of 
various denominations, distinguished sportsmen.”176 Among the 
victims known by name there were, for instance: 760 doctors 
(including eight professors), 1,040 teachers (including university 
graduates and people with PhDs), over 100 lawyers, nineteen generals, 
and over 350 colonels and lieutenant-colonels.177 The lists of the 
Katyn Massacre victims also comprise thirteen academics from the 
Jagiellonian University, including six professors and two assistant 
professors.178 In total, around 100 scholars and graduates of the 
Jagiellonian University were killed in Katyn.179 Wanting to quell the 
Polish national element, the Soviet authorities found themselves in a 
situation that was very favourable from their point of view. The 
reserve officers were people who made up the social, academic and 
171. Id. at 141. 
172. Sir Owen St. Clair O’Malley, Katyn: Despatches of Sir Owen 
O’Malley to the British Government 15 (1972). 
173. Joseph Howard Tyson, World War II Leaders: A Historical 
and Astrological Study 312 (2011). 
174. Maria Szonert-Binienda, Katyn Families Struggle for Justice, in Katyn: 
State-Sponsored Extermination 51 (Maria Szonert-Binienda ed., 
2012). 
175. See Inessa Jazhborovskaya, The Katyn Case: Working to Learn the 
Truth, Russ. Acad. Sci. Soc. Sci., 2011, at 34, 45. 
176. Adamska et al., supra note 104, at 42.  
177. Tucholski, supra note 38, at 134. 
178. Id.  
179. Id. 
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cultural elite of the Polish nation.180 As historians have established, 
they constituted a “particularly active, highly patriotic, independence-
oriented element.”181 
The criminal actions of the political police of the Third Reich and 
of the USSR against Poles were coordinated. As scholars point out: 
What influenced the fate of the Polish officers was the 
collaboration between the NKVD and the Gestapo that began 
as early as autumn 1939 with meetings of representatives of 
both services: in October 1939 in Lviv, in January 1940 in 
Kraków, and in March 1940 in Kraków and Zakopane (‘Pan 
Tadeusz’ and ‘Telimena’ villas).182  
Some authors (e.g., Władysław Bartoszewski, Jerzy Łojek and 
Tucholski) suggest that the Katyn Massacre may have been linked to 
the results of talks between the NKVD and the Gestapo.183 In this 
context Lebedeva observes that, “The ‘relief operation’ in the three 
camps by Beria’s department and the ‘A-B’ operation of the Nazi 
secret service were carried out simultaneously is . . . highly 
symptomatic.”184 
It is important to remember that genocide exists not only when 
the perpetrators intend to destroy an entire group, but also when they 
want to destroy some part of it. Thus the problem can be viewed 
from the perspective adopted by the president of the Institute of 
National Remembrance of the Republic of Poland, Janusz Kurtyka, 
and the president of the board of the Karta Foundation, Zbigniew 
Gluza, who have suggested that the subject of genocide was not only 
the Polish nation but also its leadership part: the intellectual elite. 
Both authors have written about “the Polish intellectual elite 
(“intelligentsia’) whose extermination by the Germans and the Soviets 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Jordanek, supra note 167, at 121; Jacek Ślusarczyk, Agresja sowiecka na 
Polskę w 1939 r., Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny, no. 2,  1993, at 
16. 
183. Władysław Bartoszewski, Pakt Ribbentrop-Mołotow w doświadczeniu 
Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego, in O Likwidację Skutków Zmowy 
Hitler-Stalin. Materiały z Konferencji Zorganizowanej Przez 
Komisję Ustawodawczą oraz Komisję Spraw Zagranicznych i 
Integracji Europejskiej Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 58–
59 (Małgorzata Lipińska ed., 1999); Jerzy Łojek & Leopold 
Jarzewski, Agresja 17 Września 1939. Studium Aspektów 
Politycznych 65–71 (4th ed. 1990); Tucholski, supra note 38, at 133. 
184. Lebedeva, supra note 7, at 159. 
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was to have deprived the captive nation of its leadership class.”185 
Scholars indicate that “part of a group” may mean also in this sense 
its leadership,186 intellectuals187 or soldiers.188 A crucial part of a group 
is the part that is critical to its survival.189 The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia notes that “selective” destruction 
of a national group remains genocide.190 The perpetrators may be 
motivated by, for instance, their desire to seize power in a state. 
Thus, political intent does not exclude the possibility of a crime being 
classified as genocide. 
VII. The NKVD’s Polish Operation in 1937–1938 and the 
Katyn Massacre as the Crime of Genocide with 
Regard to the Principles of Lex Retro non Agit  
and Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 
Some scholars wonder whether the Katyn Massacre may be 
considered an act of genocide, given the fact that the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was only 
adopted in 1948. Moreover, the USSR as well as the Belarusian SSR 
and the Ukrainian SSR did not ratify it until 1954.191 The issue of 
whether the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
185. Janusz Kurtyka & Zbigniew Gluza, Przedmowa, in Polska 1939–1945. 
Straty osobowe i ofiary represji pod dwiema okupacjami 7 
(Wojciech Materski &Tomasz Szarota eds., 2009). 
186. Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (July 2, 1985) (prepared by Benjamin Whitaker).  
187. John Quigley, The Genocide Convention: An International 
Law Analysis 182 (2006). 
188. Id. at 183–85. 
189. Dominika Dróżdż, Zbrodnia Ludobójstwa w Międzynarodowym 
Prawie Karnym 212, 215(2010); Quigley, supra note 187, at 188. 
190. Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case. No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 82 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 19, 1999). The Tribunal stated:  
Genocidal intent may therefore be manifest in two forms. It may 
consist of desiring the extermination of a very large number of 
the members of the group, in which case it would constitute an 
intention to destroy a group en masse. However, it may also 
consist of the desired destruction of a more limited number of 
persons selected for the impact that their disappearance would 
have upon the survival of the group as such. This would then 
constitute an intention to destroy the group “selectively.” 
 Id. 
191. Genocide Convention, supra note 51, art, 10. 
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Crime of Genocide was constitutive or declarative in its nature with 
regard to determining the content and the penalization of the crime of 
genocide was taken up by, among others, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). It did so in its Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1951, 
concerning Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.192 The Court states, “The 
principles underlying the Convention are recognized by civilized 
nations as binding on States even without any conventional 
obligations.”193 Thus, the ICJ admits that the Convention does not 
ban genocide and does not penalize such actions, but only codifies the 
existing custom. 
A number of treaty regulations are just codifications of existing 
international customs and vice versa: many legal norms contained in 
international agreements with time become customary law, which is in 
force regardless of whether a state is or is not party to an agreement. 
International custom is a source of international law equal to that of a 
treaty. This is reflected, for instance, in the content of Article 
38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute.194 
The recognition that customary provisions may be binding in 
states not all of which are parties to treaty regulations equivalent to 
these provisions has been reflected, for example, in the judgement of 
the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal).195 We can 
also refer here to the ICJ judgement of June 27, 1986 in the case 
concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against 
Nicaragua. In this judgment, the Court concluded that states might 
be bound by certain norms of customary law without being parties to 
treaties that formulated the norms.196 As scholars, including Shaw, 
later stressed, “the Court observed that the Convention did not 
contain any clause the object or effect of which was to limit the scope 
of its jurisdiction ratione temporis so as to exclude events prior to a 
particular date.”197 
The question whether genocide is an act for which perpetrators 
may be prosecuted when they committed it before the entry into force 
of the Genocide Convention is one that national courts have had to 
192. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).  
193. Id. at 23.  
194. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
195. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of 
German Major War Criminals (Sept. 20–Oct. 1, 1946), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf.  
196. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98–99 (June 27). 
197. Shaw, supra note 59, at 265. 
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face as well. The court’s position is extremely important, given the 
fact that, as Lech Gardocki rightly points out, persons in breach of 
international criminal law may be charged and brought before both 
international and national courts.198 Domestic courts, when trying 
people charged with committing international crimes, exercise both 
international and national jurisdiction, for they are bodies of states 
(i.e., entities authorised by the provisions of international law to act 
in this respect).199 Generally speaking, a state may act only through 
its bodies, in this particular case, through judicial bodies. 
Furthermore, in most cases it is the states—through actions of their 
judicial bodies—that enforce the provisions of international criminal 
law. This reflects the general structure of this body of law whereby 
responsibility under the law is enforced by states through their 
judicial bodies unilaterally (before domestic courts) or collectively 
(before international courts).200 Article 6 of the Genocide Convention 
states that such cases can be tried by an international tribunal or by 
a tribunal of the state in the territory of which an act of genocide was 
committed.201 As Gardocki stresses:  
This provision does not limit the criminal jurisdiction based on 
principles other than the principle of territoriality, but only 
imposes an obligation on the state in which the crime was 
committed. It also indicates the priority of this state with 
regard to trying the perpetrator, which may be of significance 
for the enforcement of Article 7 concerning extradition. Article 7 
198. Lech Gardocki, Zarys prawa karnego międzynarodowego 114–
15 (1985). Anna Sosińska expressed the existence of this rule, when she 
referred to the case law of the Supreme National Tribunal [a special 
court in Poland from 1946 to 1948, with jurisdiction over “fascist-
hitlerite criminals and traitors to the Polish nation”], saying that the 
Tribunal “fulfilled its duty to its own nation and to humanity.” Anna 
Sosińska, Powstanie i działalność Najwyższego Trybunału Narodowego, 
in W czterdziestolecie powołania Najwyższego Trybunału 
Narodowego, Materiały z posiedzenia naukowego Głównej 
Komisji Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce – Instytutu 
Pamięci Narodowej w dniu 20 stycznia 1986 r., at 41(1986). 
199. See Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime of the 
International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between 
State Sovereignty and the Fight against Impunity, in 2003 U.N.Y.B. 591, 
592. 
200. See Karol Karski, Osoba prawna prawa wewnętrznego jako 
podmiot prawa międzynarodowego 241, 249, 263, 361 (2009); 
Michał Królikowski, Problem “Prawa Karnego Międzynarodowego,” 3 
Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego 60, 60–61 (2007); Philippe Sands, 
After Pinochet: The Role of National Courts, in From Nuremberg to 
The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice 68–
108 (Philippe Sands ed., 2004). 
201. Genocide Convention, supra note 51, art. 6.  
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also introduces a principle whereby genocide shall not be 
considered as a political crime for the purpose of extradition.202 
The issue of responsibility for genocide committed during World 
War II was considered by the American Military Tribunal III, which 
heard the case of high-ranking officials of the Reich ministry of justice 
as well as German Nazi prosecutors and judges (the so-called Justice 
Trial).203 This took place before the adoption of the Genocide 
Convention. The Tribunal concluded that genocide could be classified 
as a form of crime against humanity. This is pointed out by, for 
instance Basak, who states that: 
This is how we can interpret the view that due to its scope and 
influence on the international order, it is ‘the most specific 
illustration’ of these crimes. Consequently, it held that the 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity thus defined—i.e., as 
genocide—cannot complain of injustice. They bear the 
responsibility, because they must have been aware of the 
unlawfulness of their acts, so they knew these acts were 
punishable.204 
The American occupation tribunal based its reasoning on the UN 
General Assembly resolution number 96(I) of December 11, 1946.205 It 
affirms that “genocide is a crime under international law which the 
civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principals 
and accomplices—whether private individuals, public officials or 
statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, 
political or any other grounds—are punishable.”206 Thus the resolution 
was treated as a document codifying the existing customary norm.207 
As Basak rightly notes, this was codification in the same sense as 
the inclusion in the London Agreement and the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal) of a provision 
202. Gardocki, supra note 198, at 111. 
203. The trial is discussed in greater detail in id. at 69–71. 
204. Basak, supra note 63, at 355. See also Fall 3: das Urteil im 
Juristenprozess gefällt am 4. Dezember 1947 vom 
Militärgerichtshof III der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika 
135 (P. A. Steiniger et al. eds, 1969) [hereinafter Fall 3: das Urteil 
im Juristenprozess]. 
205. See Affirmation of the General Principles of International Law 
Recognized by the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/95(I) (Dec. 11, 1946). 
206. See id. See also Genocide Resolution, supra note 54.  
207. For more on the legal significance of this resolution, see, e.g., William 
A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law 45–47 (2000). 
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referring to crimes against humanity.208 This conclusion was probably 
inspired by a remark made by Tadeusz Cyprian and Jerzy Sawicki 
that such was the relation between resolution 96(I) and the 1948 
Genocide Convention codifying the principles expressed in it.209 
The American Military Tribunal III also made an interesting 
interpretation of the significance of the UN General Assembly 
resolutions, which—as we know—are not legally binding acts. It said 
that the UN’s main body adopting the resolutions was not an 
“international law-making body.”210 It was, however, the “most 
reliable, among the bodies existing today, to express the world 
opinions.”211 Therefore, the fact that it recognized genocide as “a 
crime under international law” was the “key evidence” of the fact that 
this was indeed the case in the legal sense. The Tribunal stated, “We 
agree with its position and adopt it as our own.”212 Cyprian and 
Sawicki, too, considered genocide to be a special form of crime against 
humanity.213 
The problem of whether someone might be tried for and convicted 
of genocide committed during World War II was one that faced the 
Israeli court in Adolf Eichmann’s case. The crimes of this officer of 
the SS, the SD and the Department IV (Gestapo) of the Reich 
Security Head Office (RSHA) were also committed in 1940 (i.e., at 
the same time as the Katyn Massacre).214 The trial took place after 
the adoption of the Genocide Convention, on the basis of the Knesset 
Act on August 1, 1950 regarding the punishment of Nazis and people 
collaborating with Nazis.215 Adolf Eichmann was charged with and 
then convicted of crimes against humanity, war crimes, membership 
of hostile organizations and crimes against the Jewish people.216 In 
208. Basak, supra note 63, at 355. 
209. See Tadeusz Cyprian & Jerzy Sawicki, Prawo Norymberskie: 
Bilans i Perspektywy  537 (1948). 
210. Fall 3: das Urteil im Juristenprozess, supra note 204, at 135. 
211. Id.  
212. Id.  
213. Cyprian & Sawicki, supra note 209, at 537. 
214. See generally The Eichmann Trial—Proceedings: The 15 Charges, 
Remember.org, http://remember.org/eichmann/charges.htm (last 
visited May 6, 2013) (listing the charges against Eichmann, as well as 
details like when they were committed). 
215. Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710–1950, 2 LSI 115 
(1950-1951). 
216. See  Kazimierz Kąkol, Adolfa Eichmanna droga do Bejt Haam 
315–16 (1962); Baron Edward Frederick Langley Russell of 
Liverpool, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann 29–31, 305 (2nd ed. 
2002) [hereinafter Lord Russell of Liverpool]; Wierczyńska, supra 
note 148, at 47. 
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this case, “the Israeli court invoked, in fact, Article 2 of the 
Convention (i.e., the designation of the crime of genocide contained in 
it) because Section (b) of the Act (‘Crimes against the Jewish people’) 
was simply a transformation of this designation.”217 In its judgement 
the Israeli court observed that Section (b) of the Act was modelled on 
Article 2 of the Convention.218 It also added that “the ‘crime against 
the Jewish people under . . . the Israeli law constitutes a crime of 
‘genocide’ within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention, and 
inasmuch as it is a crime under the law of nations, Israel’s legislative 
authority and judicial jurisdiction in this matter is based upon the 
law of nations.”219 In this context William Schabas observes that: 
A more direct link with the Genocide Convention itself exists in 
the Eichmann prosecution. The accused was charged pursuant 
to legislation enacted to give effect to Israel’s obligations under 
the Convention. The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) 
Law, which was adopted in 1950 and was explicitly intended to 
apply retroactively, contained a provision entitled “crimes 
against the Jewish people.” It was essentially identical to the 
definition of genocide in Article 2 of the Convention except that 
it did not apply generally to national, ethnical, racial and 
religious groups, but only to “the Jewish people.” Eichmann was 
convicted on this basis for acts perpetrated between 1941 and 
1945.220  
Schabas added, “there is some evidence of proceedings for the 
crime of genocide directed at acts perpetrated prior to entry into force 
of the Convention. The Eichmann trial, held in Israel in the early 
1960s, is the great example here.”221 As Basak notes: 
[T]he judgement in question was to prove that genocide had 
been recognized as a crime under international law already 
during World War II. This was required by the fundamental 
tenet of the judgement whereby the law, though retroactive, 
was by no means an ex post law. For it did not lead to 
217. Basak, supra note 63, at 356. 
218. IsrDC (Jer) 40/61 Attorney-General v. Eichmann, [1961] 36 ILR 18 
(DC), para. 16. The Supreme Court of the State of Israel upheld this 
ruling. IsrSC (Jer) 40/61 Attorney-General v. Eichmann, [1968] 36 ILR 
277. 
219. 36 ILR 18 (DC), para. 25. 
220. William A. Schabas, Retroactive Application of the Genocide 
Convention, 4 U. St. Thomas J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 36, 46 (2009) 
(footnotes omitted). 
221. Id. at 41. 
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punishment of acts which were not recognized as crimes when 
they were committed.222 
On the other hand, Wierczyńska stresses that “this trial was 
unique. . . . [I]t called genocide a crime under international law and 
applied universal jurisdiction to it. In the end it treated genocide, here 
appearing as ‘crimes against the Jewish people’ as a crime separate 
from crimes against humanity.”223 
Significantly, the Israeli court invoked the 1948 Convention “by 
name,” stating in paragraph 16 of its judgment that it was a model 
for the “crimes against the Jewish people” that Eichmann was 
charged with.224 This was how genocide committed against the Jews 
was defined in Israel at the time. 
In this case, the Israeli court invoked Resolution 96 (I) which 
affirms that “genocide is a crime under international law” and that 
even before the resolution was adopted “many instances of such 
crimes of genocide” had occurred.225 Notably, the former concept was 
formulated before the adoption of the Genocide Convention. 
Moreover, in the 1948 Convention the parties observe that humanity 
had seen acts of genocide before this international agreement was 
concluded.226 The very nature of the Convention means that it is not 
a constitutive act when it comes to defining and punishing the crime 
of genocide. The Israeli court also invoked the Advisory Opinion of 
the ICJ from 1951.227 Given the fact that the principles of the 1948 
Convention are—according to the ICJ—“binding on States, even 
without any conventional obligations,” the Israeli court concluded 
that “there is no doubt that genocide has been recognized as a crime 
under international law in the full legal meaning of this term, ex tunc. 
That is to say, the crimes of genocide committed against the Jewish 
People and other peoples were crimes under international law.”228 
Kubicki rightly points out that in such cases “from the point of 
view of the protection of fundamental rights of individuals, of great 
significance is the nullum crimen sine lege poenali anteriori 
222. Basak, supra note 63, at 356. 
223. Wierczyńska, supra note 148, at 48. 
224. 36 ILR 18 (DC), para. 16. 
225. Id. para. 17.  
226. See Genocide Convention, supra note 51, pmbl. 
227. 36 ILR 18 (DC), para. 18. 
228. Id. para. 19. See also Kąkol, supra note 216, at 316–18; Lord Russell 
of Liverpool, supra note 216, at 306–08. In this context we should 
add that Adolf Eichmann was also convicted of deportation in inhumane 
conditions of about 500,000 Polish civilians. 
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principle.”229 That is why an assessment of a legal instrument with 
regard to general principles of criminal law should involve checking 
whether and to what extent the instrument covers acts that were not 
prohibited by criminal law when they were committed. However, if 
acts included in the scope of a legal instrument were unlawful and 
punishable already as they were committed, then the instrument does 
not establish the unlawfulness of an act ex post facto; it concerns 
unlawful acts ex tunc. In such a case, as Kubicki rightly observes, the 
instrument simply creates “a new, more synthetic legal construct 
bringing a provision of the law closer to specific manifestations of the 
occupying power’s criminal activities and made the criminal sanction 
more severe owing to the drastic scale of the consequences of these 
activities.”230 The crime of genocide may comprise various actions and 
omissions. However, in the case of the Katyn Massacre we are dealing 
with murders, which have always carried the maximum sentence in 
any legal system. Thus, in this particular case sanctions could not be 
more severe. 
As Basak noted, referring in 1998 to the judgment of the Israeli 
court, “There is no reason why such a conclusion should not be 
applied to the victims of the Katyn Massacre only because the court 
quoted here had a different perpetrator in mind. Moreover, this 
murder fully complies with the designation of Article 2 of the 
Convention.” Basak further added, “We could, referring to the 
description included in the judgment of the Supreme National 
Tribunal in the case of Arthur Greiser, observe that the genocidal 
intent also involved fatal mutilation, weakening of the ‘physical force’ 
and ‘national resistance’ of the Poles.”231 Anna Sosińska also pointed 
to the trial of Amon Göth, the “subject of which was genocide.”232 She 
added that: 
It was the first trial in the history of the judicial system, not 
only Polish but also international, concerning exclusively the 
issue of genocide. This trial as well as that of Arthur Greiser 
took place before the end of the Nuremberg Trial. The 
judgments were delivered before those delivered in Nuremberg. 
It is all the more important to emphasize the fact in the 
Tribunal’s view the actions of the accused had all the 
229. Leszek Kubicki, Najwyższy Trybunał Narodowy. Próba bilansu 
orzecznictwa, in W czterdziestolecie powołania Najwyższego 
Trybunału Narodowego, Materiały z posiedzenia naukowego 
Głównej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce – 
Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej w dniu 20 stycznia 1986 r., at 
18(1986). 
230. Id. 
231. Basak, supra note 63, at 358. 
232. Sosińska, supra note 198, at 43. 
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characteristics of genocide; a new type of crime [which had 
previously been known] was named.233 
Kubicki was right when—referring to the formulation by the 
Supreme National Tribunal of general legal principles—he said that:  
The lack of appropriate precedents in the history of Polish law 
as well as the relatively considerable general nature of the 
norms included in the “August decree” and of the norms of 
international law applicable here meant that when formulating 
these principles the Tribunal played an important role as a law-
maker, with many of its conclusions being pioneering, and not 
only in Poland. The Tribunal’s judgment in Greiser’s case was 
delivered before the judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg.234 
We should also take into account the fact that Canada’s Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of June 29, 2000, empowers 
national courts to exercise jurisdiction over genocide committed in the 
past, without any temporal limitation.235 According to Section 6(1) of 
this Act, “Every person who, either before or after the coming into 
force of this section, commits outside Canada     . . . genocide . . . is 
guilty of an indictable offence and may be prosecuted for that 
offence.”236 
The Nuremberg Tribunal held that the non-retroactive nature of 
the provisions of criminal law was a principle that could be adopted 
in any legal system.237 It is not, however, a constitutive principle or 
foundation of such a system. It is introduced by means of positive law 
instruments. In its 1946 judgment, the Tribunal said that that “it is 
233. Id. at 42. For more on the trials before the Supreme National Tribunal, 
see, e.g., Tadeusz Cyprian & Jerzy Sawicki, Siedem wyroków 
Najwyższego Trybunału Narodowego (1962); Gardocki, supra 
note 198, at 93–95.  
234. Kubicki, supra note 229, at 11. Kubicki refers to the Decree of August 
31, 1944 on the sentencing of the Fascist-Hitlerite criminals guilty of 
murders and persecution of the civilian population and POWs, and of 
the traitors of the Polish Nation. See Journal of Laws 1944, no. 4, item 
16 (Poland). See also Alexander V. Prusin, Poland’s Nuremberg: The 
Seven Court Cases of the Supreme National Tribunal, 1946–1948, 
Holocaust Genocide S., Spring 2010, at 1, 3 (describing the August 
Decree and the prosecution of criminals). 
235. See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24, § 
8(b) (Can.). 
236. Id. § 6(1). 
237. Cf. James Popple, The Right to Protection from Retroactive Criminal 
Law, 13 Crim. L.J. 251, 252 (1989) (describing the novel step to apply 
criminal law retroactively at the Nuremberg Tribunal). 
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to be observed that the maxim ‘nullum crimen sine lege’ is not a 
limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice.”238 
This court concluded that international law did not contain such a 
limitation at the time.239 It is recognized to have been introduced into 
international law by Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of December 19, 1966.240 However, when 
constructing this provision, its authors made sure that it would not 
preclude the possibility of bringing to justice the perpetrators of 
crimes committed before and during World War II on the basis of 
international agreements adopted later. That is why the Covenant 
includes Article 15(2), which states that, “Nothing in this article shall 
prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or 
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognized by the 
community of nations.”241 
The authors of the treaty—a fundamental document concerning 
the protection of human rights—made sure that international 
criminals would not be able to use its provisions in order to escape 
justice. A solution analogous in its effects can also be found in Article 
7(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950.242 
238. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of 
German Major War Criminals, at 39 (Sept. 20–Oct. 1, 1946), available 
at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf. 
239. See id.  
240. The ICCPR states:  
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of 
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, 
under national or international law, at the time when it was 
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one 
that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was 
committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, 
provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter 
penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.   
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 15(1), Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
241. Id. art. 15(2).  
242. In particular, Article 7 states:  
(1) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on 
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a 
criminal offence under national or international law at the 
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be 
imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the 
criminal offence was committed.  
 
(2) This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of 
any person for any act or omission which, at the time when 
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The adoption of these provisions was another confirmation in 
international law of the fact that the prosecution and punishment of 
the perpetrators of international crimes in the second half of the 1930s 
and first half of the 1940s had so far been and would continue to be a 
manifestation of binding international law. Mass murders, whatever 
name and classification are attributed to them, have always been 
crimes.243 If several years after they were committed they are classified 
and, for instance, some of them are termed “genocide,” then there is 
no obstacle in international law to bringing their perpetrators to 
justice by defining them in this manner. According to the written 
statement of the U.S. government to the ICJ in 1951: 
The practice of genocide has occurred throughout human 
history. The Roman persecution of the Christians, the Turkish 
massacres of Armenians, the extermination of millions of Jews 
and Poles by the Nazis are outstanding examples of the crime of 
genocide. This was the background when the General Assembly 
of the United Nations considered the problem of genocide.244  
In this context it is worth returning once again to Lemkin’s 
observation that this new word that he coined in 1944 denoted an 
“old practice in its modern development.”245 Marian Flemming noted 
it was committed, was criminal according the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 
 
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 7, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
243. This can be seen, for instance, in the case of a Burgundian knight and 
governor of Alsace, Peter von Hagenbach, who in 1474 was tried by an 
international—German-Swiss-Alsatian—tribunal and convicted of 
cruelty to the inhabitants of Breisach, of acts which we today describe 
as “war crimes.” Edoardo Greppi considers these acts to be also “early 
manifestations of what are now known as ‘crimes against humanity.’” 
For more on the case of von Hagenbach, see, e.g., Edoardo Greppi, The 
Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under International 
Law, 835 Int’l R. Red Cross, Sept. 1999, at 531, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq2x.htm. See 
also Anna Potyrała, Współpraca Państw z Międzynarodowymi 
Trybunałami Karnymi a Suwerenność: Studium Politologiczno-
Prawne 9 (2010); William A. Schabas, Introduction to the 
International Criminal Court 1 (3d ed. 2007); Georg 
Schwarzenberger, 2 International Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals: The Law of Armed 
Conflict 462–466 (1968); Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed 
Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War 6, 29–30, 59, 
342 (2010). 
244. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, Written Statement of the United States of 
America, 1951 I.C.J. 25 (May 28).  
245. Lemkin, supra note 47, at 79.  
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that as well. Writing about the Katyn Massacre, Flemming pointed 
out that, “[u]nder the legislation in force in 1940, this was a war 
crime.”246 He was, however, right in adding that, “[u]nder the current 
provisions of international law, it is, in addition, a crime of 
genocide.”247 It should be mentioned that Schabas stresses that the 
1948 Convention is applicable to international criminal atrocities that 
occur during peacetime; this view was prompted by Lemkin’s 
displeasure with the inability to prosecute German Nazis for the 
atrocities immediately preceding the outbreak of World War II.248 
For the 1948 Convention is an instrument intended by its authors to 
cover crimes like those committed against Jews during the Nazi 
regime period in Germany.249 This period was also marked by the 
acts of the Soviet authorities against the Poles, including the 
NKVD’s so-called “Polish operation” and the Katyn Massacre. 
Schabas doubted only whether the Convention could be applied to 
events that had occurred much earlier, for instance, the massacre of 
the Armenians between 1915 and 1917.250 
VIII.The Problem of Responsibility 
The issue of the subjective scope of the Convention application 
returned many years later, when it turned out that the crime of 
genocide was not a historical phenomenon. In its judgment of July 11, 
1996, in the case concerning the application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide—Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia—the ICJ concluded that the regulations 
enshrined by the Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes.251 
Moreover, the type of responsibility provided for under Article 9 of 
the Convention does not exclude any form of state responsibility. In 
246. Flemming, supra note 65, at 324. 
247. Id. 
248. William A. Schabas, Origins of the Genocide Convention: From 
Nuremberg to Paris, 40 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 35, 36 (2008).  
249. See Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The United States and the Genocide 
Convention 108 (1991) (stating that the language of the Genocide 
Convention, in combination with the negotiations that were on-going at 
the time of its drafting, indicated that the drafters of the Convention 
“had the Holocaust in mind when they adopted it”). 
250. This view was expressed during a conference entitled Katyn: Justice 
Delayed or Justice Denied? that took place at Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio, on February 4–5, 2011. 
251. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 595, 616 (July 11).  
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the case of the Katyn Massacre, responsibility is attributed to the 
USSR, the continuator of which is the Russian Federation.252 
Both historians and lawyers are working on bringing to light all 
the circumstances of this crime. What matters is the truth. At the 
same time we cannot forget that some perpetrators of the Katyn 
Massacre might still be alive. If we are still prosecuting and finding 
German Nazi criminals from that period who are still alive, this might 
also be the case with the perpetrators of Stalinist crimes. The crime of 
genocide is not subject to the statute of limitations under Article 1(b) 
of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations 
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity of 1968.253 
The perpetrators of genocide can be tried by national courts. 
Under Article 6 of the Genocide Convention, persons charged with 
genocide “shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the 
territory of which the act was committed.”254 With regard to the 
territory of Poland, this state is Poland. In the case of the entire 
territory of the former USSR (i.e., state whose agents committed the 
crime) this state is its continuator, the Russian Federation. Moreover, 
with regard to acts committed within the territory of the former 
Belarusian SSR and Ukrainian SSR, these states are—in addition to 
252. For more on the co-existence of international responsibility of the state 
and the individual for infringements of humanitarian law of armed 
conflicts, see Elżbieta Karska, Odpowiedzialność państwa za 
naruszenia międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego 
konfliktów zbrojnych 76–86 (2007) and Elżbieta Socha, 
International Responsibility of Individuals for Breaches of Humanitarian 
Law, 26 Polish Yearbook Int’l L. 67–84 (2002). 
253. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, art. 1(b), Nov. 11, 1970, 754 
U.N.T.S. 73.  
254. Most places where Poles were murdered, including Katyn, are located 
outside the territory of Poland, as defined in the Peace Treaty of Riga 
of March 18, 1921, 6 L.N.T.S. 123. However, some of the atrocities were 
committed within this territory. Under international law and Polish law, 
the territories that Poland lost in the East following World War II did 
not become subject of cession of territory between Poland and the USSR 
until February 5, 1946, i.e., the day of the exchange of ratification 
documents related to the Agreement on the Polish-Soviet State Border 
of August 16, 1945, 10 U.N.T.S. 193. The date of the cession is 
confirmed in, for instance, the case law of the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal. See Resolution of the Tribunal of April 30, 1996 Concerning a 
Universally Binding Interpretation of Article 8(2)(a) of the Act of 
February, 23 1991 on Finding Invalid the Rulings Concerning Persons 
Persecuted for Their Work for an Independent Polish State as 
Formulated by the Act of February 20, 1993, OTK ZU, no. 2/1996, tem 
15; Judgement of the Tribunal of November, 18 2003, case file P 6/03, 
OTK ZU, no. 9A/2003, item 94. See also Karol Karski, Agresja ZSRR 
na Polskę w świetle prawa międzynarodowego, in Rzeczpospolita, 
Sept. 16–17, 1995, at C19. 
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the Russian Federation—their continuators. All the more so, given 
the fact that both these Soviet republics, the Republic of Belarus and 
Ukraine, apart from the USSR itself, also ratified the Convention on 
their own.255 
As stated above, Gardocki notes that Article 6 of the 1948 
Convention “does not limit the criminal jurisdiction based on 
principles other than the principle of territoriality, but only imposes 
an obligation on the state in which the crime was committed.”256 
Under the principle of universal jurisdiction competent courts in this 
case include the courts of all other states whose domestic laws make it 
possible.257 Among them is the state whose citizens were victims of the 
crime. In Poland, investigations of acts of genocide committed 
between September 1, 1939 and July 31, 1990 against Polish nationals 
or Polish citizens of other nationalities were launched and conducted 
by the prosecutors of the Institute of National Remembrance.258 In 
such cases, an investigation is not only to achieve the standard 
objective of criminal proceedings, mentioned in Article 2(1) of the 
Polish Code of Criminal Procedure,259 including finding the 
perpetrator and having him punished by a court, but also to bring to 
light all the circumstances of the case, in particular, to establish the 
names of the victims.260 This is why an investigation may be 
conducted, even when the perpetrator is known to have died. Only 
after this particular objective has been achieved are the proceedings 
discontinued.261 The objective of the proceedings is not just to bring 
255. For more on the relations under international law between the Russian 
Federation and the USSR, the Republic of Belarus and the Belarusian 
SSR, and Ukraine and the Ukrainian SSR, see, e.g., Karol Karski, 
Kontynuacja prawnomiędzynarodowej podmiotowości ZSRR i jego części 
składowych przez państwa istniejące na obszarze postradzieckim, Studia 
Iuridica, 2006, at 74–101. 
256. Gardocki, supra note 198, at 111. 
257. Kąkol, supra note 216, at 317; Lord Russell of Liverpool, supra 
note 216, at 310–11. 
258. The Act on the Institute of National Remembrance—Commission for 
the Prosecution of Crimes Against the Polish Nation, arts. 1(1)(a), (3), 
& 5(1), Journal of Laws 1998, no. 155, item 1016, as amended 
[hereinafter IPN Act], available at http://www.ipn.gov.pl/portal 
/en/31/327/The_Act_on_the_Institute_of_National_Remembrance.h
tml. 
259. Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 2(1), Journal of Laws, no. 89, 
item 555, as amended (stating that one of the purposes of the code is to 
hold criminals liable and to ensure that innocent people are not held 
liable for criminal offenses). 
260. IPN Act, supra note 258, art. 45(3).  
261. Compare id. art. 45(4) with Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 
17(1)(5).  
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the perpetrator to justice, but primarily to shed light on a case (i.e., 
establish all the facts related to the crime). From the point of view of 
Poland, what matters is bringing these crimes out of the fog of 
secrecy, to save them from oblivion and to establish the names of the 
victims, many of whom are still unknown today. 
Article 6 of the Genocide Convention states that persons accused 
of genocide can also be tried by “such international penal tribunal as 
may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which 
shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”262 No current international 
criminal court would have jurisdiction with respect to the 
perpetrators of the Katyn Massacre. It certainly cannot be any of the 
existing ad hoc tribunals, because their statutes contain territorial, 
temporal, and personal limitations. The permanent International 
Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction in this case either. It is 
competent only with respect to trying people charged with 
international crimes—specified in its statute263—committed after the 
entry into force of this international agreement. 
Theoretically, a new international court or tribunal could be 
established. The perpetrators of the Katyn Massacre (recognized as 
genocide) could be tried provided that “the creators of such new ad 
hoc tribunal, when defining the basis of its jurisdiction, took into 
account . . . the category” of the crime of genocide “and, just like the 
Israeli legislator, used the designation of Article 2 of the Convention. . 
. . The genocide category would not require differentiation of the 
victims’ formal status, as it would be the case with crimes against 
humanity.”264 For the latter may be committed only against “any 
civilian population.”265 It would, therefore, cover only some victims. 
Such a tribunal could base its jurisdiction on a transfer of national 
jurisdiction, including national jurisdiction resulting from the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction. 
Zdzisław Galicki wrote as early as 1992 in the context of an 
analysis of the Katyn Massacre with regard to international law that:  
The political changes of recent years have made it possible to 
open and thoroughly investigate the case of the Polish prisoners 
of war in the Soviet Union during World War II. It seems, 
however, that we should not limit ourselves to revealing the 
262. Genocide Convention, supra note 51, art. 6.  
263. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 5–8, July 1, 
2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  
264. Basak, supra note 63, at 358. 
265. Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal), 
art. 6(c), annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment 
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279. 
755 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2013 
The Crime of Genocide Committed Against the Poles 
facts that have been concealed so far. Rather, we should seek 
with determination to take appropriate legal measures, which 
find, as a matter of fact, their full justification in the norms of 
international law currently in force. It seems also that in the 
states that have emerged following the break-up of the Soviet 
Union it will be possible to find an appropriate political climate, 
enabling us to identify and bring to justice people guilty of 
crimes against the Polish prisoners of war. Regardless of the 
passage of time, which naturally reduces the number of people 
responsible for these acts, the actions to bring them to justice 
would show that there is respect for the law and, more 
importantly, for all those blameless people who met such a 
tragic end.266 
Wierczyńska makes an important point, stressing that: 
[I]n civilized countries a crime should be punished and 
stigmatized. The way we deal with a criminal system may be a 
measure of our civilization. Undoubtedly, Russia aspires to be 
among civilized states. . . . The responsibility of the 
perpetrators, a will to cooperate seem to be sine qua non 
conditions of a true reconciliation between Poland and Russia.267 
The “appropriate political climate” mentioned by Galicki changes 
both temporally and territorially.268 Moreover, the murderous acts 
266. Zdzislaw Galicki, Zbrodnie przeciwko jeńcom wojennym w świetle prawa 
międzynarodowego (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem jeńców polskich w 
Związku Sowieckim), in Zbrodnia katyńska : problem 
przebaczenia 410 (Marek Tarczyński ed., 2003). 
267. Wierczyńska, supra note 148, at 196. 
268. Jasudowicz, supra note 34, at 174. Some positive aspects concerning 
the duty to punish the perpetrators of crimes committed by both the 
German Nazi and the Soviet regimes could be found in a big, soul-
searching interview with the President of the Russian Federation 
Dmitry Medvedev, which was published in the Izvestia daily on May 7, 
2010. We can read there, for instance, that: 
There is no statute of limitations for such crimes, irrespective of 
who committed them. It is a question of our moral responsibility 
to the future generations. If today we turn a blind eye to these 
crimes, then such crimes may be repeated in the future—in one 
form or another, in one country or another. That is why—harsh 
as it sounds—there is indeed no statutory limitations for such 
crimes. Those who committed them should be brought to 
justice, regardless of how old they are today. 
 Dmitry Medvedev: “Nam ne nado stesnyat’sya rasskazyvat’ pravdu o 
voyne—tu pravdu, kotoruyu my vystradali”: Interv’yu vzyal Vitaliy 
Abramov, Izvestia.ru, May 7, 2010, http://izvestia.ru/news/361448. 
See also PAP, Mku, Rosja chce odtajnić dokumenty katyńskie i ukarać 
winnych, Onet.pl, May 7, 2010, http://www.poczciarz.home.pl/w 
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were committed a long time ago. However, there are no grounds to 
not prosecute the still living individuals who, as agents of the Soviet 
state, committed international crimes, including the Katyn Massacre. 
According to the Russian government, none of these individuals 
are alive today. However, given the scale of the crime and the 
involvement of the huge state apparatus in it, we may rightly assume 
that some of the perpetrators may still be alive. We still encounter 
living perpetrators of the German Nazi crimes, which were committed 
in exactly the same period. In April 2013 German prosecutors 
announced that investigations are being launched into the crimes of 
50 former guards of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration and 
extermination camp.269 The Nuremberg standards should be applied 
not only to the German Nazi murderers but also to the Stalinist 
murderers.270 
iadomosci/2010/05/2166474,12,1,1,item.html. So far, however, these 
words have not been translated into concrete decisions of the Russian 
prosecution service and the judiciary bodies. 
269. Germany to Investigate 50 Auschwitz Guards, The Jerusalem 
Post, Apr. 7, 2013, http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-
World/Jewish-News/Germany-to-launch-case-against-50-
Auschwitz-guards-308951. 
270. Few people know that on July 13, 1994, the head of the investigative 
group of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian 
Federation, prosecutor Anatoly Y. Yablokov, when deciding to 
discontinue criminal proceedings on account of the death of the 
perpetrators, said in giving grounds for his decision that the members of 
the Politburo—Joseph Stalin, Anastas Mikoyan, Mikhail Kalinin and 
Lazar Kaganovich—as well as the head of the NKVD, Lavrenty Beria, 
were guilty of crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity mentioned in Article 6(a)–(c) of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal). The remaining 
NKVD employees who committed the murder were guilty of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. Prosecutor Yablokov also concluded that 
these acts were acts of genocide under the Genocide Convention of 1948. 
But three days later the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office of the 
Russian Federation revoked that decision and took the case away from 
him. It was finished by another prosecutor in 2004 and the decision to 
discontinue the investigation was not made public. Lebedeva, supra 
note 7, at 358–59; Mikhael Zygar & Yelena Chernenko, Strach Rosji, 
Newsweek Russkiy, no. 37, 2009, at 18–21.  For more on responsibility 
of natural persons under international law, see Gardocki, supra note -
198, at 22–101; Michal Królikowski, Pawel Wiliński, Jacek 
Izydorczyk & Małgorzata Znojek, Prawo Karne 
Międzynarodowe Wybór Źródeł 50–362 (2008); Elżbieta Mikos-
Skuza, Odpowiedzialność osób fizycznych, Edukacja Prawnicza , no. 
1, 1998, at 28–30; E. Socha, Odpowiedzialność osób fizycznych w 
międzynarodowym prawie karnym, in 7 Nowa Kodyfikacja Prawa 
Karnego 77 (Leszek Bogunia ed., 2003).  For more on the application 
of Nuremberg standards to natural persons who committed Stalinist 
crimes, see also Basak, supra note 63, at 325–358; Piotr Kładoczny, 
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IX. Conclusion 
The actions taken by the Soviet authorities with regard to the 
Poles, both before and during World War II, including the NKVD’s 
so-called Polish operation and the Katyn Massacre, were acts of 
genocide under international law. They were part of the USSR’s 
genocidal policy, which included deprivation of national identity, 
deportations, and mass murders of members of the Polish nation. 
These actions were taken before the outbreak of World War II with 
regard to the Poles living in the USSR. The spread of the USSR’s 
territorial rule in 1939 only extended this criminal policy to new 
areas. 
This genocide lasted until the moment when the USSR—not of its 
own will—became a member of the anti-Hitler coalition in 1941. One 
should remember that activity intended to exterminate Poles on the 
basis of national criteria had been continued until the end of July 
1941, thus after the German-Soviet conflict begun. They were stopped 
for pragmatic reasons when the USSR concluded a treaty with the 
Polish government-in-exile about conducting common warfare against 
a new enemy, which was Germany. 
When pointing to the political context of these actions, we have 
to remember that Poles were not the only victims of the Soviet 
system. People were exterminated according to criteria other than the 
nationality criterion. Yet, when this occurred because the victims 
were Polish or belonged to any other national or ethnic group, the 
classification as genocide cannot be avoided. If genocide is part of a 
state’s policy, this does not mean that we are not dealing with this 
international crime only because an entire nation is classified as 
“politically suspect and hostile element.” One of the protected 
groups–by virtue of the Genocide Convention–is the nation. Its 
destruction in whole or in part, as such, on national or for political 
reasons, is a crime of genocide. During preparatory works, the USSR’s 
proposal to limit the applicable motives was rejected and a solution 
proposed by Venezuela, with no enumeration and no limitation of 
motives, was adopted. The object, which is to destroy the protected 
group, must not be confused with the motive. We have to agree with 
the German historian Klaus Hildebrand, who said that, “Genocide 
was committed by the Nazi Germany under the aegis of race, and by 
the Stalinist Soviet Union under the aegis of class struggle.”271 It is 
also true that Stalin was a Polonophobe and that even before the 
outbreak of World War II the Soviet authorities carried out a smear 
campaign against the Poles and created a negative image of them in 
Zbrodnie stalinowskie na terytorium II Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1939-
1945 w świetle Prawa Norymberskiego, 27 Studia Iuridica 187 (1995). 
271. Courtois, supra note 15, at 125. 
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Soviet society. The genocide was stopped for pragmatic reasons only 
when the USSR found itself—by no means willingly—among the 
states of the anti-Hitler coalition.  
Only a few Poles, included in the Katyn extermination order, 
enacted by the USSR’s authorities, avoided death. The Hitlerite 
Concentration Camps also released a few representatives of 
exterminated groups from time to time, which does not mean, that 
one may question whether on that basis genocide then took place. 
Among those murdered by the USSR authorities, there were also 
some representatives of other nationalities. They died, because by the 
Soviet regime they were subjectively recognized as Poles, an element 
of Polish national core. It must not be forgotten that German Nazis 
murdered not only Jews, Poles, and Gypsies; the Serbs not only 
Bosnian Muslims; and the Hutu not only Tutsis. In those crimes, 
international, occupation and national courts recognized that genocide 
was committed. 
Genocide was legally separated as a new type of international 
crime by virtue of the 1948 Genocide Convention. On the grounds of 
its provisions adopted after its implementation, German perpetrators 
of the World War II genocide were brought to justice. This happened, 
for example, during the trial of Adolf Eichmann, held in Israel in 
1961–1962 among other instances. This case is not affected by the 
nullum crimen sine lege principle, since acts, especially murders, being 
elements of the crime of genocide, were already forbidden by 
international law at the time of its commission. Their new 
classification based on the intent, which is the destruction of the 
group does not violate that principle. Today, these activities are 
called genocide. Moreover, the drafters of the 1948 Convention 
understood that they were codifying existing law, rather than creating 
new law. 
The actions of the USSR against the Poles, including the NKVD’s 
so-called Polish operation and the Katyn Massacre, fall within the 
scope of applicability of the 1948 Genocide Convention. On the other 
hand, Article 15(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights as well as Article 7(2) of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
should, in accordance with the will of their authors, overcome any 
doubts as to the possibility of punishing the perpetrators of crimes 
committed before and during World War II on the basis on 
international law instruments adopted later. The statute of 
limitations ceased to be applied to these crimes under Article 1(b) of 
the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.  
The responsibility for these crimes rests with the USSR, the 
continuator of which is the Russian Federation, and with specific 
individuals who committed these acts both on the highest and the 
lowest level. Individual infringements of international criminal law co-
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exist with international responsibility of the state. That the Katyn 
Massacre was an act of genocide does not mean that it cannot also be 
classified as a war crime. Taking into consideration all of the 
qualifications, it should be recognized that genocide should be 
indicated as the gravest of the implicated crimes. 
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